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1. Introduction
We explore in this chapter the role of rational diverse beliefs in explaining market dynamics and
volatility. To do that we examine alternative reasons for belief diversity which is rational and review
different models of market dynamics which incorporate such beliefs. The term “market dynamics”
refers to the dynamic characteristics of financial markets but we focus on dynamic phenomena that
attracted attention in the literature. Examples include excess volatility of asset returns, high and time
varying equity risk premia, high volume of trade, etc. Many are termed “anomalies” or “puzzles” as
they contradict predictions of rational expectations equilibria (in short REE) with full information.
Most studies show that fundamental exogenous factors cannot explain the observed dynamics, leading
Paul Samuelson to quip that “the stock market predicted 9 of the last 5 recessions.” We aim to explore
ideas that explain the 4 recessions the market predicted but which did not occur. The problem of
market volatility and the question whether asset markets exhibit “excess” volatility relative to
fundamental factors have been central in financial economics hence the approach explored here
addresses major questions. The approach explored here offers useful ideas for advancing the scientific
study of free markets, for public stabilization policy and for practitioners in financial markets.  
It is important to note that the idea that allocations and prices are affected by perceptions of
the future by agents is rather old. Diverse expectations are central to Thornton’s (1802) views of paper
money and financial markets. Expectations are crucial to Keynes (1936). Chapter 12 of The General
Theory examines the “state of confidence” and the importance of investors’ expectations to asset
pricing. Expectations are key to the “cumulative movements” in Pigou (see, Pigou’s (1941), Chapter2
VI) and constitute the mechanism of deviations from a stationary equilibrium in the Swedish school
(e.g. see Myrdal’s 1939 views in Myrdal (1962), chapter III).  Also, “subjective values” based on
diverse agents’ expectations are cornerstones of Lindahl (1939) theory of money and capital. 
Before turning to recent work we draw attention to an assumption made in the work reviewed
later. It holds that the distribution of beliefs in the market is an observable variable which can be
deduced from forecast panel data. It would thus be useful to briefly review some raw data available.   
In the post world war II era large data bases on heterogenous forecasts of various variables
have been assembled in Holland, Germany and Sweden. In the U.S. the Survey of Professional
Forecasts, reporting quarterly forecasts of private forecasters, was started in 1968. It was first
conducted by the American Statistical Association\National Bureau but has since been taken over by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Since 1980 the Blue Chip Economic Indicators (BLUE)
reports monthly forecasts of economic variables by over 50 financial institutions. This service was
expanded, under the title of Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, to include forecasts of interest rates and
other variables. To illustrate, Table 1 reports forecasts of GDP growth and change in GDP deflator in
May of 2000 for the year 2000. Actual GDP growth rate in 2000 was 4.1% and actual inflation rate
was 2.3%.  Note that in May of 2000, five months into the year, large heterogeneity  persisted. Also,
almost all GDP growth forecasts were wrong!  To understand this correlated error place yourself in
May of 2000 and make a stationary econometric forecast of GDP growth but make no special
judgment about the unique conditions in May 2000.  An example of such a model was developed by
Stock and Watson (2001, 2002, 2005). They estimate it by using a combination of diffusion indexes
and bivariate VAR forecasts and employing a large number of U.S. time series. In May of 2000 the
non-judgmental stationary forecast of GDP growth was lower than most private forecasts.
Repeating the experiment over time one finds the distribution of forecasts fluctuates in two
ways. First, it exhibits changes in the cross sectional variance of the forecasts, reflecting changes in
degree of disagreement. Second, it exhibits large fluctuations over time in relation to the stationary
forecasts reflecting correlation in forecasters’ views about unusual conditions at the time. Sometimes
forecast distributions are below the stationary forecast while in May of 2000 the distribution was
above the stationary forecast. Observe that the noted large data banks of market forecast distributions
are publically available for many variables because forecasters are willing to reveal their forecasts.3
 
Table 1: May 2000 BLUE Forecasts of Growth and Inflation Rates for the Full Year 2000
May 2000 Forecasted Percent Change In Real GDP
              GDP Growth             Price Deflator
Forecast for 2000                   
First Union Corp. 5.3H 2.0
Turning Points (Micrometrics) 5.2 2.1
J P Morgan 5.2 2.1
Evans, Carroll & Assoc. 5.1 2.2
Mortgage Bankers Assn. of Amer. 5.1 2.1
Goldman Sachs & Co. 5.1 2.1
U.S. Trust Co. 5.1 2.0
US Chamber of Commerce 5.1 2.0
Banc of America Corp. 5.1 2.0
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 5.1 1.9
Wayne Hummer Investments LLC 5.0 2.3
Bank One 5.0 2.1
Nomura Securities 5.0 1.9
Merrill Lynch 5.0 1.9
Perna Associates 4.9 2.3
National Assn. of Home Builders 4.9 2.1
Macroeconomic Advisers, LLC 4.9 2.1
Prudential Securities, Inc. 4.9 2.0
LaSalle National Bank 4.8 2.3
Conference Board 4.8 2.3
Wells Capital Management 4.8 2.2
DuPont 4.8 2.1
Northern Trust Company 4.8 2.1
Chicago Capital, Inc. 4.8 2.0
Deutsche Bank Securities 4.8 1.8
Chase Securities, Inc. 4.8 1.8
Credit Suisse First Boston 4.8 1.8
Comerica 4.7 2.4
Moody’s Investors Service 4.7 2.2
Fannie Mae 4.7 2.0
Federal Express Corp. 4.7 2.0
SOM Economics, Inc. 4.7 1.9
National Assn. of Realtors 4.7 1.9
National City Corporation 4.7 1.9
Clear View Economics 4.7 1.9
Eggert Economic Enterprises, Inc. 4.6 2.1
WEFA Group 4.6 1.9
Eaton Corporation 4.6 1.9
Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. 4.6 1.2 L
Ford Motor Company 4.5 1.8
Motorola 4.5 1.7
Standard & Poors Corp. 4.5 1.7
UCLA Business Forecasting Proj. 4.4 2.1
Inforum - Univ. of Maryland 4.4 2.0
Prudential Insurance Co. 4.4 1.9
Weyerhaeuser Company 4.3 2.2
DaimlerChrysler AG 4.3 2.0
Georgia State University 4.2 2.2
Kellner Economic Advisers 4.2 2.0
Econoclast 4.1 2.0
Naroff Economic Advisors 4.0 L 2.5 H
We thus note that for any variable, individual forecasts are correlated and the average market
forecast fluctuates around the stationary forecast. This non-judgmental forecast is a central yardstick
in the work reviewed later. Also observe the cross sectional variance of forecasts fluctuates over time. 
Despite the impact of the rational expectations paradigm, belief heterogeneity has been used to
explain many phenomena such as asset price volatility, risk premia, volume of trade, money non-
neutrality. There are two general theories of rational behavior motivated by the observed diversity.
One follows the Harsanyii doctrine, viewing people as Bayesians who hold the same prior probability
but with asymmetric private information used in forecasting. Examples of papers includes Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980),  Phelps (1970), Lucas (1972), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Townsend (1978,
1983), Singleton (1987), Brown and Jennings (1989), Grundy and McNichols (1989), Wang (1994),
He and Wang (1995), Judd and Bernardo (1996, 2000), Morris and Shin (2002, 2005), Woodford
(2003), Hellwig (2002, 2005), Angeletos and Pavan (2006), Angeletos and Werning (2006),  Allen,4
Morris and Shin (2006), Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinski (2006). 
An alternative view sees no evidence for the use of private information in forecasts of market
prices or economic aggregates. It finds no justification for a common prior and insists diverse beliefs
about state variables is inevitable in a complex world. A sample of papers taking this approach includes
Harrison and Kreps (1978), Varian (1985, 1989), Harris and Raviv (1993), Kurz (1994, 1996, 1997a,
1997b, 1997c, 2007) Detemple and Murthy (1994), Frankel and Rose (1995), Kandel and Pearson
(1995), Cabrales and Hoshi (1996), Kurz and Beltratti (1997), Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998),
Kurz and Motolese (2001, 2007), Kurz and Schneider (1996), Kurz and Wu (1996), Kurz, Jin and
Motolese (2005a, 2005b), Nielsen (1996, 2003, 2005, 2006), Motolese (2001, 2003),Wu and Guo
(2003, 2004), Fan (2006), Acemoglu et al. (2007), Nakata (2007), Guo and Wu (2007).
We first clarify the differences between the above two theories and examine whether they solve
the problems outlined. Since the range of issues is wide, we concentrate on rationalized beliefs and this
excludes two types of models. The first are Behavioral Finance and Noise Trading models where belief
diversity arises from psychological but irrational motives. Second, learning models with common
information which are typically models of convergence to rational expectations hence in these models
belief diversity is not persistent. Before turning to an evaluation of the difference between these two
approaches it is useful to clarify the standards we set for advocating or rejecting a theory. 
Since standard models explain dynamics with exogenous shocks and these are not sufficient to
explain the data, to explain excess volatility we search for mechanisms of endogenous amplification.
In addition, it will become clear that not all belief heterogeneity generates market dynamics. Hence,
one asks what must be the structure of heterogeneity for belief diversity to matter? The data reveals
heterogeneity persists hence the two key criteria for effective diversity in any theory are that it has
aggregate effects and that these effects are non-vanishing. The non-vanishing condition is challenging
to models of asymmetric information under rational expectations since information revelation of prices
leads back to a common belief and hence diversity cannot persist. Asymmetric private information in a
rational expectations equilibrium is therefore usually supplemented with a “noisy” mechanism to avoid
revelation. But then one must ask if such a mechanism is natural or is it just an artificial construct? Is it
testable?  Requiring diversity to have persistent aggregate effects implies that heterogeneity by itself is
not sufficient and it must be supplemented with dynamic features. To understand the importance of5
this fact consider two examples. (1) Beliefs are diverse, randomly and independently distributed over
agents with a fixed distribution over time. Here an agent’s belief measured by say, a density over
states, changes over time but is randomly determined. The i.i.d. distribution causes a cancellation of
the effects of beliefs hence there is a constant, typically small, aggregate effect. Such a distribution
implies that diversity is irrelevant. (2) Beliefs are heterogeneous with a fixed distribution of beliefs so
the belief of each agent is fixed on that distribution. Now an agent always has the same superior or
inferior information or else, specific agents are always more optimistic or more pessimistic than others.
A fixed belief distribution also implies that prices, volume of trade and risk premia fluctuate only in
response to exogenous shocks hence we are back to a theory, rejected by the data, that publicly
observed exogenous shocks are the only cause of fluctuations. Such distributions of beliefs do not
generate the desired endogenous amplification to explain excess volatility. These examples show that
the dynamics of beliefs over time is essential and the question is what is its source. Under asymmetric
private information such dynamics could be generated by an exogenous flow of private information
which entails a process of belief updating. How effective or plausible is such an assumption must be
carefully weighed and we discuss it in detail in Section 2.3. The situation is different under diverse
beliefs with common information since dynamics and rationality are inherently interrelated. We explain
in Section 3.1 that the central principle which drives the theory of rational heterogenous beliefs is that
rational diversity of correlated beliefs without private information implies market volatility.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the structure of noisy REE asset pricing
theory. It shows that although this theory has many useful features, it fails to deliver a consistent
theory of financial market dynamics. Indeed, volatility and volume of trade decline with belief
diversity. Section 3 reviews the theory of diverse beliefs with common information. It shows that the
theory delivers a consistent and plausible model of endogenous amplification and provides a
foundation for understanding market dynamics. Section 4 reviews simulation models based on the
theory in Section 3. It shows that simulations of models with diverse beliefs match the observed data
well. Finally, Section 5 reviews some open problems. 
2.  Can Market Dynamics be Explained by Asymmetric Private Information?
The literature on asset pricing in  “noisy” REE under asymmetric private information is large6
and Brunnermeier (2001) provides a good survey. We discuss it in three stages. In Section 2.1 we
present a universally used model with exponential utility. In Section 2.2 we discuss dynamic versions
of the model. In Section 2.3 we evaluate the ideas developed.
2.1  A General Model of Asset Pricing Under Asymmetric Information
The model reviewed here is an adaptation of the short lived trader model of Brown and
Jennings (1989). Similar models were used by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia
(1981), Singleton (1987), Grundy and McNichols (1989), Wang (1994), He and Wang (1995),
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005, 2006), Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) and others. 
There is a unit mass of traders, indexed by the [0, 1] interval and a single aggregate asset with
unknown intrinsic unit value V. The economy is static with one period divided into three trading dates
(no discounting): at date 1 traders first receive public information y and private signals  about the x i
asset value and then they trade. At date 2 they trade again. At date 3 (or end of date 2) uncertainty is
resolved, the true liquidation value V is revealed and traders receive it for their holdings. Public
information is that V  is distributed in accord with   . The private signal   about V is   Q-N(y, 1
α
)x i
 where    satisfy    independently across i.   are known. Since these facts x i'Q%εi εi εi-N(0, 1
β
) (α , β)
are common knowledge, agents know the true unknown value V is “in the market” since by the law of
large numbers the mean of all private signals is the true value  V. Trader  i  starts with S
i units of the
aggregate asset and can borrow at zero interest rate to finance trading.   are i’s demands in (D
i
1 ,D
i
2 )
the first and second rounds and   are market prices in the two rounds. Ending wealth is thus (p1 ,p 2)
. All  traders are assumed to have the same utility over wealth  W
i'S
ip1%D
i
1(p2&p1)%D
i
2(V&p2)
, and they maximize expected utility. Aggregate supplies  of shares, each u(W
i) '& e
&(W i/τ) (S1,S2)
representing an asset unit, traded in each of the rounds are random, unobserved and independently
normally distributed with mean zero. This noise is crucial to ensure that traders cannot deduce from
prices the true value of V. In a noisy REE traders maximize expected utility of final wealth while
markets clear after traders deduce from prices all possible information. Indeed, Brown and Jennings
(1989) show that equilibrium price at date 1 is of the form
(1a) p1 ' κ1(λ1y% μ1V & S1)
and since S1  is normally distributed,  p1  is also normally distributed. Keep in mind that V and S1  are7
unknown, hence (1a) shows that prices are not fully revealing. Since over trading rounds  V remains
fixed, more rounds of trading generate more price data from which traders deduce added information
about V. But with additional supply shocks the inference problem becomes more complicated. That is,
at date 2 the price  p2 contains more information about V but it depends upon two unobserved noise
shocks (S1 , S2). Hence, the price function is shown to be time dependent and at date 2 takes the form
(1b) . p2 ' ˆ κ2(ˆ λ2y% ˆ μ2V & S2 % ψS1)
Since the realized noise  S1 is not observed, traders condition on the known price  p1 to infer what they
can about S1. They thus use a date 2 price function which takes an equivalent form
(1c) . p2 ' κ2(λ2y% μ2V & S2 % ξ21p1)
By (1a), equivalence means   Denote by κ2' ˆ κ2 , λ2 ' (ˆ λ2%λ1ψ),μ2 ' (ˆ μ2%μ1ψ)a n dξ21 '&ψ
κ1
.
 the information of  i  in the two rounds. The linearity of the equilibrium price map implies (H
i
1 ,H
i
2 )
that the payoff is normally distributed. Brown and Jennings (1989) show in their Appendix A that there
exist constants , determined by the covariance matrix of the model’s random variables and (G1 ,G 2)
assumed by most writers to be the same for all agents, such that the demand functions of  i are
(2a)  . D
i
2(p2) ' τ
Var i(V|H
i
2)
[E i(V|H
i
2) & p2]
(2b) . D
i
1(p1) ' τ
G1
[E
i(p2 |H
i
1 ) & p1] %
(G2 & G1)
G1
[E
i(D
i
2 |H
i
1 )]
Most writers assume   independent of  i. The second term in (2b) is the “hedging Var
i(V|H
i
2) ' σ
2
V
demand” arising from a trader’s date 1 perceived risk of price change between date 1 and date 2. The
hedging demand in a noisy REE complicates the inference problem and raises equilibrium existence
problems. As a result, most writers ignore this demand and study myopic-investor economies where
there are only “short lived” traders who live one period only. They first trade in date 1, gain utility
from p2 and leave the economy. They are replaced by new short lived traders who receive the
information of the first traders but trade in date 2 only and gain utility from the revealed V. None of
them have hedging demands. A “long lived” trader lives through both periods, trades in dates 1 and  2
hence has a hedging demand. For simplicity we follow here the common practice and ignore the
second term in (2b). We now average on  i, equate to supply and conclude that
(3)       , . p2 ' ¯ E2(V) & (1
τ
)σ
2
V(S1 % S2) p1 ' ¯ E1(p2) &
G1
τ
S1
 is date 2 average market forecast of  V and   is average market forecast of   . In this ¯ E2(V) ¯ E1(p2)p 28
case   and it is assumed this variance is the same for all  i. Hence, the proof of (1a)-(1b) G1 ' Var
i
1(p2)
amounts to exhibiting a closed form solution of   and solving the joint system in (3). ¯ E2(V)
The derivation of (2a)-(2b) used a general form of conditional expectations and required only
that prices are normally distributed. It is thus a general solution for any informational structure used in
the conditioning and it does not depend upon the private character of information.  Hence, (2a)-(2b)
is applicable to models with diverse beliefs and common information as long as their implied prices are
normally distributed. Moreover, differences among theories of diverse beliefs are expressed entirely by
differences in their implications to the conditional expectations in (2a)-(2b). In the case of asymmetric
private information discussed here, (2a) shows that   depend upon date 2 expectations which are D
i
2
updated based on the information deduced from p2 and p1. This is different from date 1 information
which consists of a public signal, private signals and inference from p1 only. This is why equilibrium
price maps are time dependent. Allen et al. (2006) present in their Appendix A computations of the
closed form solution. To get an idea of the inference involved we briefly review the steps they take. 
What does a trader learn in round 1? Given a prior belief   trader  i  observes V-N(y, 1
α
)
.  Since   all he infers from date 1 price is that p1'κ1(λ1y%μ1V&S1)S 1-N(0,1/γ1)
      .  [1/(κ1μ1)](p1 & κ1λ1y)' V&[S1/μ1] - N(V , 1/(μ
2
1γ1))
But now, his added piece of information is the private signal  ,  . Using a x i ' V % εi εi-N(0, 1
β
)
standard Bayesian inference from these three sources, his posterior belief becomes
(4a)        E
i
1(V|H
i
1 ) '
αy%βx
i%μ
2
1γ1
1
κ1μ1
(p1&κ1λ1y)
α % β % μ
2
1γ1
'
(α&μ1γ1λ1)y%βx
i%
μ1γ1
κ1
p1
α % β % μ
2
1γ1
(4b) with precision       . α % β % μ
2
1γ1
Averaging (4a) over the population we can see that the average market forecast at date 1 is then
. ¯ E1(V|H1) '
(α&μ1γ1λ1)y%βV%
μ1γ1
κ1
p1
α % β % μ
2
1γ1
/
αy%(β % μ
2
1γ1)V
α % β % μ
2
1γ1
&
μ1γ1S1
α % β % μ
2
1γ1
In round 2 a trader observes p2 which, as seen in (1c), is a function of p1.  Given p1 and the fact
that  ,  he infers from   that  S2 - N(0 , 1
γ2
) p2'κ2(λ2y%μ2V&S2 % ξ21p1)
 . [1/(κ2μ2)](p2 & κ2λ2y& κ2ξ21p1) ' V&[S2/μ2] - N(V , 1/(μ
2
2γ2))9
He now updates (4a)-(4b). Since supply shocks are i.i.d. the updated posterior is standard
          . E
i
2(V|H
i
2 )'
[
(α&μ1γ1λ1)y%βx
i%
μ1γ1
κ1
p1
α % β % μ
2
1γ1
](α%β%μ
2
1γ1) % 1
κ2μ2
(p2&κ2λ2y&κ2ξ21p1)(μ
2
2γ2)
α % β % μ
2
1γ1 % μ
2
2γ2
Simplification leads to
(5a)     E
i
2(V|H
i
2 ) '
[α & μ1γ1λ1 & μ2γ2λ2]y% βx
i%[
μ1γ1
κ1
p1 %
μ2γ2
κ2
p2 & μ2γ2ξ21p1]
α % β % μ
2
1γ1 % μ
2
2γ2
(5b)  .  Var(V | H
i
2 ) ' 1
α%β%μ
2
1γ1%μ
2
2γ2
Finally, to compute (1c) we average (5a) to conclude that
(6a) ¯ E2(V) '
[α & μ1γ1λ1 & μ2γ2λ2]y% βV%[
μ1γ1
κ1
p1 %
μ2γ2
κ2
p2 & μ2γ2ξ21p1]
α % β % μ
2
1γ1 % μ
2
2γ2
(6b) . ¯ E1(p2) ' κ2(λ2y% μ2¯ E1(V)% ξ21p1)
We now solve for prices by inserting (6a)-(6b) into (3). The final step is to match coefficients of the
price functions and identify ( ,ξ21). For more details of these computations see Allen κ1,λ1,μ1,κ2,λ2,μ2
et al. (2006) , Appendix A. This verifies that prices are indeed normally distributed as in (1a)-(1b).
What is the length of memory in prices? Multiple trading rounds provide opportunities to
deduce more information from prices about  V. As trading continues, information of all past prices is
used since prices depend upon all past unobserved supply shocks. In such a case the price system is
not a finite memory Markov process. The model has been extended to multi period trading where V  is
revealed N periods later (see Brown and Jennings (1989), Grundy and McNichols (1989), He and
Wang (1995) and Allen et al. (2006)). In these models the complexity of inference depends upon the
presence of a hedging demand of long lived traders. However, for both long and short lived traders the
number of trading rounds is an arbitrary modeling construct. It would thus be instructive to examine
the limit behavior. In a third round of trading by short lived traders the price map becomes 
 . p3'κ3(λ3y%μ3V&S3 % ξ31p1 % ξ32p2)
Hence, the independent supply shock leads to an updating rule which is again standard 10
. E
i
3(V|H
i
3 )'
E i(V|H
i
2 )(α%β%μ
2
1γ1%μ
2
2γ2) % 1
κ3μ3
(p3&κ3λ3y&κ3ξ31p1&κ3ξ32p2)(μ
2
3γ3)
α % β % μ
2
1γ1 % μ
2
2γ2 % μ
2
3γ3
By expressing individual and market forecasts in terms of the unobserved variables one can easily
extend the above to N rounds of trade and it can be shown that they take the general form
(7) E
i
N(V|H
i
N) '
αy% βx i%j
N
j'1
μ
2
jγjV
α % β % j
N
j'1
μ
2
jγj
&
j
N
j'1
μjγjSj
α % β % j
N
j'1
μ
2
jγj
A standard argument shows the   converge. For simplicity assume   = γ. The independence of the μj γj
noise   together with (7) and the law of large numbers imply that with probability 1 the first term Sj
converges to V and the second converges to  0. Hence, in the limit, with probability 1 all forecasts
converge to the true  V and the effect of the public signal y disappears. This proves that repeated
trading leads to a full revelation of the true value, and that in the limit  p = V and at that time traders
do not forecast prices at all. With repeated trading the effect of  y  disappears. If the unit of time is
short, like a month, trading rounds are not really limited. Hence this result contradicts the claim (e.g.
see Allen et al. (2006)) that the effect of the public signal  y on prices lingers on forever.
Allen et al. (2006) use the model to explain the Keynes (1936) Beauty Contest. To see how,
recall that  . Then (3) implies that if there are N rounds of trade then ¯ E(Si) ' 0
(8) . p1 ' ¯ E1¯ E2 ...¯ EN(V) & [Var1(p2)/(τ)]S1
The authors then propose (8) represents the Beauty Contest metaphor since, the price is not equal to
the market expectations of V but rather, to the average expectation of what the market expects the
average expected value of V will be in the future. We comment on this interpretation in Section 3.6.5.
What have we learned so far? The key conclusions of the private information paradigm are that
equilibrium prices vary with each date’s true intrinsic value of the asset and with the random supply
shock of that date, both of which are fundamental factors. Private information, as such, has no
separate direct effect on price volatility since the effect of private information is averaged out by the
law of large numbers. Hence, the model does not posses the endogenous amplification which we seek.
In addition, since supply shocks are never observed , the repeated inference causes prices to have
infinite memory. In applications such as Brown and Jennings (1989) and Grundy and McNichols
(1989), this property was used to explain the phenomenon of “Technical Analysis” defined as the
traders’ use of past prices, in addition to today’s price, to form their demand. More broadly, the static11
model of asymmetric private information was used in widely diverse applications. One of the more
celebrated application in Macroeconomics are the Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972) island models.
2.2 Dynamic Infinite Horizon Models
In the model of Section 2.1 trades can occur but it is not a truly dynamic model. Extensions to
infinite horizon were developed for many applications and to get a sense of the issues involved we
shall review two very different applications. We start with Wang’s (1994) study of trade volume.
Wang’s (1994) aim is to overcome the no trade theorems of REE and explain the volume of
trade in asset markets. With REE perspective, his hypothesis is that trade is the result of asymmetric
private information. Using his notation, he assumes agent i  maximizes expected utility over
consumption flows   where expectations are conditioned on information of i. &E
i
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Wang (1994) assumes there are two assets with payoff in consumption units. A riskless asset with
infinitely elastic supply which pays a constant rate r and where R = 1+ r. The second asset is a risky
stock with a fixed supply set at 1 which pays a dividend   at date t. The law of motion of dividend is  Dt
      where     .    Dt ' Ft % gD,t Ft ' aFFt&1 % gF,t
are i.i.d. normally distributed, zero mean shocks. Here   is the persistent component of the (gD,t,gF,t)F t
dividend process and   is the transitory component. The structure of information is intended to gD,t
ensure that a closed form solution is possible. To that end Wang (1994) assumes there are two types
of investors. I-investors have perfect private information and observe  . The U-investors receive only Ft
a noisy signal about   in the form   where  are i.i.d. normal, zero mean shocks. Since Ft St ' Ft % gS,t gS,t
all investors observe the dividends, the I-investors observe the persistent as well as the transitory
components of dividends while the U-investors observe neither.
In addition to the public asset, Wang (1994) assumes the I-investors have a private production
technology which is risky and constant returns to scale. If they invest at t the amount   they receive at It
t+1 the amount    where excess return on the private technology  follows It(1%r%qt%1)q t%1
 and    . qt%1 ' Ξt % gq,t%1 Ξt%1 ' aΞΞt % gΞ,t%1
 are i.i.d. normal, zero mean shocks. Expected excess return   is observed only by the (gq,t%1,gΞ,t%1) Ξt
I-investors. This sharp information structure is called “Hierarchical” since it requires one class of
investors to permanently have inferior information. The economy’s structure is common knowledge
and all agents are Bayesians with normal priors about parameters they do not know.12
Two forces are used to explain the volume of trade. First, asymmetric information between the
U and the I-investors, measured by  . If   , information about the stock is symmetric σ
2
S'var(gS,t)S t ' Ft
and  . When  we have   and information is asymmetric. Second, the private var(gS,t)'0 σ
2
S >0 S t … Ft
technology of the I-investors is unavailable to the U-investors. The effect of this factor on asset
demands operates via the correlation between private excess returns   and dividends, measured by qt%1
 - the covariance of  with  . To understand how this correlation impacts asset demands σD,q gD,t%1 gq,t%1
and trade, suppose   and   increases leading I-investors to increase investments in private σD,q … 0 Ξt
technology since expected return on such investments increased. But due to  , Cov[gD,t%1,gq,t%1] … 0
such increased investment changes the risk posture of their portfolio, calling for control of the risk by
changing their investments in the publically traded stock. If  , control of risk leads to lower σD,q >0
investments in the stock and if  , it leads to increased demand for the stock. The effect of σD,q <0
asymmetric information about the private technology is thus due to the need of the I-investors to
control their risk while the U-investors are unable to distinguish between changes in   and  . It Ft Ξt
shows that the set-up of public and private technologies is crucial for Wang’s (1994) results. Without
private technology, just the asymmetry  does not lead to trade since in this case the uninformed St … Ft
investors deduce   from prices, Wang’s (1994) REE becomes fully revealing and we are back to no Ft
trade. With   the price is linear in   and  , uninformed investors are “confused” and cannot σD,q … 0F t Ξt
deduce either one from the price. This confusion of the U-investors makes it impossible for them to
determine the cause of price changes. The U-investors now use the history of the process to conduct a
Kalman Filtering in order to form expectation of their unobserved  . In sum, Wang (1994) shows that Ft
the model generates trade due to the exogenous shocks   and    which cause time variability in the Ft Ξt
investment composition of the I-investors. 
We pause briefly to examine the causes of price and volume volatility in models of noisy
rational expectations equilibria. In the earlier models equilibrium prices, such as (1a)-(1b), only vary
with exogenous shocks to supply. In Wang (1994) prices vary only in response to exogenous shocks
 and  . This result continues to hold in all other dynamic models of private information such as He Ft Ξt
and Wang (1995). What is the effect of increased diversity of private information? In the earlier
models private information was so diverse that the law of large numbers was invoked so that private
information had no effect on prices. If diverse private information is to be the cause of trade one would
expect that increased diversity of private information should increase the volume of trade. The13
problem is that Wang (1994, page 145) shows the opposite: increased diversity of private information
decreases the volume of trade. This results from the fact that rising diversity of private information
cause uninformed traders to have rising difficulties in deducing from prices useful information needed
for trade. We thus conclude that in noisy REE price volatility and volume of trade are caused by
exogenous shocks while diverse private information does not cause or explain them. We are thus
back to the standard model without any endogenous amplification effect.
  A second example is Woodford (2003) who revisits the Lucas (1972) model. It is motivated by
the fact that Lucas (1972) explains transitory effects of monetary policy but fails to account for the
observed fact that monetary disturbances have persistent real effects. Woodford assumes agents are
Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competitive price setters who select the nominal price of their product but
cannot set the real price since they do not observe the aggregate price level and aggregate output.
Although producers cannot observe the real price, their own output is determined by the real price.
Aggregate nominal GNP is the exogenous state variable (e.g. determined by monetary policy). In
equilibrium date t aggregate price level and aggregate output are functions of date t nominal GNP and
of all higher order market expectations (i.e. market expectations of market expectations of ...) about it.
As in Lucas (1972) agents cannot observe nominal GNP and receive private signals about it. Being
rational they learn from the available information and, as in Wang (1994), use a Kalman Filtering
procedure to learn about the unobserved state variable. With incomplete learning of the persistent
exogenous nominal GNP, Woodford (2003) demonstrates persistent money non-neutrality.
Limited space prevents our discussing other applications. Examples include Townsend (1978,
1983), Amato and Shin (2003), Hellwig (2002, 2005) and Angeletos and Werning (2006) who study
business cycles, Morris and Shin (2002, 2005) who study the transparency of monetary policy,
Singleton (1987) who study bond markets, Bacchetta and van Wincoop’s (2006), and  Hellwig,
Mukherji and Tsyvinski (2006) who study the volatility of foreign exchange rates and many other
policy oriented papers using Global Coordination games. These applications use persistent belief
heterogeneity to explain the behavior of market aggregates. However, why is it asymmetric private
information that should provide a basis for heterogeneity? With asymmetric private information agents
clearly make different forecasts. Hence, there is the temptation to assume private information in order
to model diversity and many authors have done just that. This is so common that for some, agents with
different opinions are synonymous to agents with different private information. Such identification14
should be rejected. Private information is a very sharp sword that must be used with care. As we have
seen, deducing information from prices is complicated and should be employed only when well
justified. The virtual equivalence between belief diversity and private information is particularly wrong
in macroeconomic applications when agents are assumed to have asymmetric private information with
respect to aggregate variables such as interest rates or growth rate of GNP. We have serious doubts
about the applicability of the private information paradigm to study asset market dynamics and will
now pause to evaluate the results derived so far. 
2.3 Is Asymmetric Information a Satisfactory Theory of Market Dynamics?
In questioning the use of asymmetric private information assumption we recall that phenomena
studied with private information include the volatility of asset price indices, interest rates, risk premia,
foreign exchange rates, business cycles, etc. In such models individual agents forecast aggregate
variables. We thus break our query into two questions. First, does the model of asymmetric private
information deliver a satisfactory mechanism of market volatility? Second, as a modeling device is it
reasonable to assume that economic agents have private information about such aggregate variables?
Starting with the first question our answer is no. In all noisy REE with diverse and independent
private signals, asymmetric private information has no impact either on price volatility or on volume of
trade. In general, increased diversity of private information decreases volatility and volume of trade.
In any noisy REE all dynamic characteristics are fully determined either by the standard exogenous
shocks such as dividends or by exogenous “noise” which is often questionable if it is unobserved.
Since we aim to explain excess volatility of markets with mechanisms of endogenous amplification, it
follows that the asymmetric private information paradigm does not offer such amplification but rather,
it leads us simply back to the traditional causes of market dynamics. We examine the second question
by outlining 5 issues raised with noisy Rational expectations equilibria. 
(i)  What is the data that constitutes “private” information?  For the case of individual firms the
nature of private information is clear and we discuss it under (ii). Now, if forecasters of GNP growth
or future interest rates use private information, one must specify the data to which a forecaster has an
exclusive access. Without it one cannot interpret a model’s implications since all empirical implications
are deduced from restrictions imposed by private information. In reality it is difficult to imagine the
data which constitute private information.15
(ii) Without correlation private information explains little. Even if some agents have some private
information about some firms, an aggregate model may have no implications to market dynamics. To
deduce any implications private information has to be repetitive over time, correlated and widespread.
There is no empirical evidence for that. Indeed, all models of noisy REE assume private information to
be i.i.d. distributed and in that case private information has no effect on volatility, asset pricing or on
any other dynamic characteristics. 
(iii)  Asymmetric information implies a Secretive Economy. Forecasters take pride in their models and
are eager to make their forecasts public. Consequently, there are vast data files on market forecasts of
many variables. In discussing public information forecasters explain their interpretation of information
which is often framed as “their thesis.” In contrast, an equilibrium with private information is secretive.
Agents do not divulge their private information since it would deprive them of the advantage they
have. In such an equilibrium private forecast data are treated as sources of new information used by all
to update their own forecasts. The fact that forecasters are willing to reveal their forecasts is not
compatible with private information being the cause of persistent divergence of forecasts.
(iv) If private signals and noise are unobserved, how could common knowledge of the structure be
attained and how can we falsify the theory?  To deduce private information from public data the
structure of private signals must be common knowledge. For example, in Section 2.1 x i ' Q % εi
where   are pure noise, independent across i. A simple question arises: if these are not publically εi
observed signals, how does common knowledge come about? How does agent i know his own signal
takes the form  and that the signal of  k is  ? Also, if the crucial data of a theory are x i'Q%εi x k'Q%εk
not observable, how can one falsify the theory? What are then the true restrictions of the theory?
(v)  Why are private signals more informative than audited public statements?  Most results of
models with private information are based on the assumption that private signals are more informative
than public information. For example, in the model of Section 2.1 the public signal is   where y'E(Q)
V is unknown. Knowing y  is inferior to knowing V. The private signals are    with    i.i.d. x i ' Q%εi εi
and there is a continuum of traders. It is then assumed “the market” aggregates the private  and x i
learns V hence equilibrium price is a function of the unknown V. This procedure raises two questions. 
(a) Why are private signals more precise than the professionally audited public statements? 
(b) Who does the aggregation and knows the i.i.d. structure needed for aggregation? If that agent is a16
neutral agent why does he not announce V? Or, if not neutral, he should be part of the model.
In summary, models with asymmetric private information paradigm fail to explain the observed
volatility and the assumptions made have questionable empirical basis. Hence, one must conclude that
asymmetric private information is not a persuasive assumption for modeling market dynamics. 
3.  Diverse Beliefs with Common Information: the General Theory.
Rational expectations and behavioral economics have staked out two extreme positions in
contemporary thinking. Under rational expectations people know all structural details needed for
perfect forecasting while under behavioral economics they are driven by psychological impulses that
lead to irrational behavior. The theory of rational belief offers an intermediate concept of rationality
that begins with imperfection of human knowledge, assumes people optimize given the limited
knowledge they have and concludes with a recognition that with imperfect knowledge rational people
make mistakes. Rational mistakes may be magnified to a point where changing perceptions dominate
public life and asset markets. This is the road to rational diverse beliefs and endogenous amplification
which we explore. Before proceeding we mention the papers of Harrison and Kreps (1978), Varian
(1985, 1989), Harris and Raviv (1993), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Kandel and Pearson (1995), 
Cabrales and Hoshi (1996). These, together with the early writers mentioned in the Introduction 
recognized the importance of diverse expectations. We do not review them since they did not anchor
the theory with a concept of rationality. In this connection we also note the adaptive equilibrium
model of Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) in which agents are boundedly rational.
3.1 A Basic Principle: Rational Diversity Implies Volatility
In contrast with asymmetric private information models, we now explain that theories of
rational diverse beliefs provide a mechanism for endogenous amplification of volatility. Start by noting
that any model discussed here assumes agents do not know a true probability and hold diverse beliefs
about it. This induces two basic questions. First, why do agents not know what they do not know?
Second, what is their common knowledge basis? Before proceeding to these questions we clarify our
notation. The symbols Π and m are reserved for special probability measures over infinite sequences to
be defined shortly. Letters like Q or P describe probabilities over infinite sequences. However, it is
useful to think of a “belief” as a collection of conditional probabilities. Hence, instead of i’s belief Q
i3 The technical definition of “non-stationary” which we use requires the process to be time dependent, and this is the
customary terminology in Ergodic Theory and Stochastic Processes. It is different from the use of this term in the Time Series
literature which requires the process to have infinite variance.
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we also use terms like “belief” or “date t belief” in reference to date t conditional probability Q i(C|Ht)
where   is date t information. Here belief, or date t belief, refers to a density, a joint distribution or Ht
transition function at t which is a component of  Q
i. This abuse of notation avoids multiple definitions
of belief and should not be confusing when the context is clear. We now return to the two questions.   
Starting with the second question, although assumptions about what is common knowledge
vary, one answer is general: it is past data on observed variables. There is a vector of observable
economic variables  over time with a data generating process under a true unknown probability xt0úN
Π on infinite sequences. At t, agents have a long history of past observations  , allowing (x0,x1,...,xt)
rich statistical analysis. Given this data, all agents compute the same finite dimensional distributions of
the data hence all know the same empirical moments, if they exist. They then deduce from the data an
empirical probability on infinite sequences denoted by  m  which is then the empirical common
knowledge of all. It will be seen later that  m  is stationary. Turning now to the first question, the basic
cause of diverse beliefs is the fact that m and Π are not the same. We briefly explain why.
Our economy has undergone changes in technology and institutions, and these have had deep
economic effects rendering the data process { } non-stationary. Although this means that xt,t'1,2,...
the distributions of the  ‘s are time dependent
3, a simple way to express it is to say the data process xt
constitutes a sequence of “regimes.” But each “regime” is relatively short with insufficient data to
enable agents to learn each of these regimes with any degree of precision. Just to recall a sample of
environments we have witnessed in recent years, note that before 1973-1979 we had never seen oil
shocks and before the 1980's we had never encountered a S&L distortion of the size we had. The dot
com technology cycle of 1996-2001 resulted from the novelty of the internet and the market’s failure
to predict the timing of its effect: Google was not even a factor then. Finally, the current sub-prime
mortgages crisis results from the fact that the securitization it generated has never been seen before.
One source of the crisis is the fact that there is no prior data with which one can predict with accuracy
the effect of lower home prices on the rate of default of these securities. In short, it is impossible to
learn the unknown probability Π. The stationary probability  m (if it exists) is then just an average over
an infinite sequence of changing regimes. It reflects long term frequencies but it is not the true18
probability under which the data is generated. Belief diversity arises when agents believe m is not the
truth and the past is not adequate to forecast the future. All surveys of forecasters show that subjective
judgment contributes more than 50% to final forecasts (e.g. Batchelor and Dua (1991)). Individual
subjective models are thus the way agents express their interpretation of the data. Being common
knowledge, the stationary probability m is a reference point for any rationality concepts.
Is it rational to believe  m is the truth?  Those who believe the economy is stationary hold this
belief. The theory of rational beliefs (see Kurz (1994, 1997a) defines an agent to be rational if his
model cannot be falsified by the data m. The theory then has a simple implication that addresses the
crucial question of dynamics. It says an agent’s date t belief cannot be constant or time invariant
unless he believes the stationary probability  m  is the truth. To see why, consider an agent who holds a
constant belief at date t (e.g. time invariant transition function) which is different from the one implied
by m. Since it is constant, the time average of his belief is not  m. Since  m  is the time average in the
data, this proves the agent is irrational. In simple terms, it is irrational to be permanently optimistic or
pessimistic relative to m. By implication, if a rational agent’s belief persists in disagreeing with m then
such a belief must fluctuate over time around m. Hence rationality induces dynamic fluctuations on the
level of individuals! Now assume a population exhibits a persistent diversity of beliefs across agents. It
implies that most hold beliefs which disagree with m. But then, we have seen this requires individual
beliefs to fluctuate over time. Finally, for an aggregate effect of beliefs one only adds the empirically
established fact (see Section 3.4.1) that individual beliefs are correlated and this leads to the conclusion
that rational diversity implies aggregate dynamics.  
Diversity of beliefs without private information is often questioned by asking how could agents
be wrong and rational at the same time. The idea that rational agents may be wrong relative to an
unknown truth is a central component of the theory. Indeed, when rational agents hold diverse beliefs
while there is only one true probability law of motion then most agents are wrong most of the time.
Since agents’ beliefs are correlated, the average market belief is also often wrong and this is the source
of endogenous propagation of market risk and volatility, called “endogenous uncertainty” by Kurz
(1974) and Kurz and Wu (1996). Sections 3.2 - 3.3 provide a precise outline of the above ideas.
3.2 Stability and Rationality in A General Non-Stationary Economy
In a stationary economy joint probabilities are time invariant and the Ergodic Theorem19
holds: time averages equal expected values under the true probability and this probability is deduced
from relative frequencies of events. In such environment the empirical distribution reveals the truth
and since human history is long, agents learn the structure from the data. The fact is that the real
data generating mechanism is not stationary and history matters. The question is then how to
discuss rationality and empirical distributions in a complex environment? What is the regularity we
can use for analytical evaluation? The answer leads to a definition of rational beliefs and we outline
it now. The development in this section is based on the material in Kurz (1994).
Let   be a vector of the N observables and let   . Let a future xt ε X fú N x'(x0,x1,x2,..)
sequence from  t on  be  hence  x
0 / x. The history up to date  t  is defined by  xt'(xt,xt%1,xt%2,...)
.  Let   be the space of infinite sequences x  and let B  be the Borel σ-field (x0,x 1,x 2,...,xt)X 4 (X 4)
of  . Events in B  are denoted by letters U, S, T etc. For an event Sε B( ) define the sets  X 4 (X 4)X 4
/  the event S  occurring k periods later. Clearly, .   S (k) ' x|x k ε S, k $0S ' S (0)
Definition 1: A set SεB( ) is said to be invariant if  . X 4 S (1) ' S
Definition 2: A probability Π  on ( , B( )) is said to be ergodic if for any invariant set S we X 4 X 4
have  Π(S) = 1 or Π(S) = 0.
Throughout the discussion we assume ergodicity so as to simplify the exposition. Under this
assumption we develop the basic equivalence theorem which is the basis of the theory of rational
belief. We start with the concept of Statistical Stability. For any finite dimensional set UεB()   X 4
 define the following time average
mn(U)(x)' 1
n j
n&1
k'0
1U(xk)'
The relative frequency that U occurred
among n observations since date 0
where
1U(y)' 1i fy 0U
0i fy óU.
Although the set U  is finite dimensional, it can be a complicated set.  For example
. U '
state 1 today# $1, state 6 next year$16,
2 # state 14 five years later # 54 This in contrast to the theory of checking rules (e.g. Dawid (1985)) which can be effectively implemented only “at
infinity” after one has infinite number of observations. 
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Definition 3:  (Property 1)  A probability Q  on ( B( )) is statistically stable  if for each X 4,X 4
cylinder (i.e. finite dimensional) set Uε B(X4)
(i) lim
n 64
mn(U)(x) ' m Q(U)(x) exists Q a.e.
Since by ergodicity  is Q a.e. independent of  x, we add the notation m Q(U)(x)
(ii)  m Q(U)(x) ' m Q(U) Q a.e.
The restriction to finite dimensional sets results from the fact that we have only finite data hence we
cannot ascertain if an infinite dimensional event actually occurred
4. The first property of statistical
stability means the process satisfies the conclusions of the ergodic theorem although it does not
satisfy the standard condition of stationarity, used to prove it. Hence, data generated by a stable
process have the property that the empirical relative frequencies of events converge and all finite
moments exist. 
The limits in Definition 3 may not exist for infinite dimensional sets. Hence the set function
defined by the limits above is not a probability. However, standard extension theorems permits
extension of    to a probability measure on  B ). To avoid multiple notation we do not m Q (X4,( X 4)
distinguish between these two set functions and denote the extension   as well. We also have: m Q
Theorem 1:     is unique and stationary. It is thus called "the stationary measure of Q." m Q
We now introduce the concept of weak asymptotic mean stationary probability measure. 
Definition 4:  (Property 2) A probability Q  on ( B( )) is Weak Asymptotic Mean Stationary  X 4,X 4
if for each cylinder set U0B( ) the limit X 4
    exists. lim
n64
1
n j
n&1
k ' 0
Q( U(k)) ' mQ(U)
Averaging probabilities of future events  , is like averaging over date t beliefs over time. Such U (k)
average is required to converge. The set function   is not a probability but by extension one mQ(S)5 We always have only finite data which enable agents to compute at date t only  . This depends upon the mt(U)(x)
data used and with time  converges to the limit probability. The assumption made in the text is that the data mt(U)(x)
sequence is very long and the probability  m is simple enough (i.e. Markov with short memory) that with finite data agents can
obtain a good approximation for the limit measure  m. The assumption that agents know the limits is very strong and should not
be interpreted to mean we assume agents have an infinite sequence of observations since in that case agents will consider not
only limits on sequences but also limits on all infinitely many possible subsequences. With finite data one can observe only a
finite number of subsequences at all dates and for this reason we do not incorporate restrictions that would be implied by limits
on subsequences. We also note that in the non-ergodic case the data requirement is greater, since then we need data for many
alternative sequences x with different starting points, but the basic theory remains unchanged. For details see Kurz (1994).
6 The assumption that the limit in Definition 3 is known to the agents is made to avoid the complexity of an
approximation theory. Without this assumption the diversity of beliefs would be increased due to the diverse opinions about the
finite approximations that would be made by different agents.  In this context we also mention that the assumption of ergodicity
is also not needed and is not made in Kurz [1994].
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deduces a probability on ( B( )) which is unique and stationary. Again, use the same notation X 4,X 4
for the extension. Thus, if Q is weak and asymptotic mean stationary then   is the probability on mQ
(,  B( )) induced by Property 2. A key result of the theory can now be stated: X 4 X 4
Theorem 2:  Properties 1 and  2 are equivalent and    for all events S 0 B() . m Q(S) ' mQ(S) X4
Theorem 2 says a data generating process which is statistically stable with probability Q has an
associated stationary probability   which can be computed in two different ways. First, it m Q ' mQ
can be deduced empirically from relative frequencies computed from the data generated by the
process. Second, it can be deduced analytically by averaging probabilities of each event over future
dates when it may occur. How do we use this equivalence to define the rationality of belief?
The data process under Π  is non-stationary and we now assume it is statistically stable and
ergodic. This is a reasonable assumption since in our economy additional data increases accuracy of
statistical analysis and moments exist. Agents do not know Π  and compute empirical frequencies
from the data. Using extension, they discover from the data
5 the probability  m  induced by the
dynamics under  Π. We reserve the notation   for the limit of the empirical frequencies under Π m(U)
hence, under our convention  . This is the stationary measure of  Π and we refer to it as m/ mΠ
“the” stationary measure or the empirical distribution. Although agents have only finite data, we
assume they actually know the limits   in Definition 3, an assumption made for simplicity
6. All m(U)
have the same data hence there is no disagreement among agents about the probability m. 
If the economy was actually stationary then  m = Π  but agents could not know this fact.22
The fact is that   and we seek a concept of rationality of belief that requires an agent to hold a m… Π
belief which is not contradicted by the empirical evidence represented by the probability m.
  
Definition 5: A probability belief  Q is said to be a rational belief relative to  m  if
(i)   Q  is a weak asymptotic mean stationary probability on  ( B( )), X 4,X 4
(ii)        for all events S 0 B() . mQ(S) ' m(S) X 4
A rational agent holds a belief  Q which is compatible with the empirical evidence  m  if:   
  for all cylinder sets S0B() . lim
n64
1
n j
n&1
k ' 0
Q(S(k)) ' mQ(S) ' m(S) X4
The first of these conditions is checked analytically by averaging date t beliefs and these should
average to a probability  . The second condition requires that   where m is common mQ mQ ' m
knowledge in the market. 
Three implication of Definition 5 are notable.  (i) Π  is a rational belief and hence rational
expectations are also rational beliefs.  (ii)  m is a rational belief although it is not the truth since
. (iii) A rational belief is generally not equal to  Π, showing agents are wrong and rational at m … Π
the same time. Agents holding rational beliefs disagree more about the short term forecasts of
variables than about forecasts of long run averages of these same variables. For example, we expect
greater disagreement about the forecast of one year inflation or output growth than about averages
of these variables over the next ten years.  
Applications of the above requires a simplification of the general rationality conditions in
Definition 5.  We thus start with two examples which use a method due to Nielsen (1996).
Example 1: Agents observe a Black Box generating numbers xt in {0, 1} without long term serial
correlation between xt and xt+k all k > 0. Using a long data set they find the mean is 0.5. The
probability  m is then the probability measure induced by a sequence of i.i.d. random variables on
{0, 1} with probability of 1 being 0.5. If the box contains a single coin the  x  sequence has an
empirical distribution of an i.i.d. fair coin, which is the truth. What other processes generate the
same empirical measure? As an example, consider a belief in a two coin family which uses the
realization of an i.i.d. sequence of random variables  gt , t = 0,1, ...  in {1, 2} with probability of 123
being, say, 1/3. A sequence is produced in advance, and is therefore known to the agent. Pick an
infinite sequence  . These realizations of  gt =1 or gt = 2  are treated as fixed g ' (g0,g1,g2,...)
parameters of a new process. It is defined by a process {vt 0{0 ,1}, t = 0, 1,...} with two i.i.d. coins
in the Box which appear at different times depending upon the   g*= (g0*, g1*,...).  vt  is then a
sequence of  independent random variables of the form
(9a)           P{vt ' 1} '
0.60 if g t ' 1 (coin type 1)
0.45 if g t ' 2 (coin type 2).
Since   (1/3)(0.60) + (2/3)(0.45) = 0.50,  the empirical distribution is the same as m for almost all g
and v. It is easy to see that instead of two possible “regimes” we could have an infinite number of
regimes. Note that we have not even specified the true probability Π.
Example 2: The data  x  reveals the empirical probability m is represented by, say, a 10 dimensional
matrix M. Again, select an i.i.d. sequence of random variables  gt , t = 0,1, ...  in G = {1, 2} with a
probability of 1 being, say, α. Next, constructs a joint probability on infinite sequences (g, x) on the
space ((X×G)
4, B((X×G)
4)) assuming the joint (g, x) process is a stationary Markov process on a
2×10 transition matrix. Suppose that over these 20 (g, x) states the matrix takes the form  
(9b) . F '
αF1 (1 & α)F 1
αF2 (1 & α)F2
States in the upper part of  F are of g = 1 and in the lower part of g = 2 hence, the marginal of F on
g is the i.i.d. distribution (α, (1- α)).  Now, when  the probabilities assigned to  are given gt ' 1x t%1
by   and when   the probabilities of   are given by   . The non- stationary probability we F1 gt ' 2x t%1 F2
seek is represented by the conditional probability of  F given g. What is the empirical distribution
under this conditional probability? Assuming Theorem 2 applies we compute the mean probability.
With probability α the matrix  is used and with probability (1- α) the matrix  is used. Hence the F1 F2
stationary distribution implied by the conditional probability of  F on g is the expected value
. It follows from Definition 5 that F is a rational belief if   . αF1 % (1&α)F 2 M ' αF1 % (1&α)F 2
Note that in Example 1 we define a rational belief by knowing in advance the infinite sequence
. In Example 2 we select only the matrix F so that at date t our forecaster knows his g'(g0,g1,...)7 In the language of Ergodic Theory, the theorem applies to general dynamical systems but we confine our attention
only to dynamical systems under a shift transformation. Since we approach the problem from the point of view of stochastic
processes we avoid the notation of Ergodic Theory altogether.
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type   but is uncertain about  . This approach is the one we follow in the rest of this Chapter.   gt gt%1
3.3 Belief Rationality and the Conditional Stability Theorem
By its own nature, non-stationarity is difficult to describe since it entails a potential infinite
variability. Examples 1 and 2 reveal a simple method to describe non-stationary probability of a real
system or as an agent’s belief. The question is how general are such systems and is there a general
principle which generalizes Examples 1 and 2 to stable but non stationary systems? The conditional
stability theorem (Kurz and Schneider (1996)) gives the answer. We explain it now.
Although the theorem holds for general dynamical systems we avoid excessive formalism
and discuss here only stochastic processes with probability measures over infinite sequences under
which the data are generated
7. We characterize a family of probabilities described by sequences of
parameters in  . These parameters represent structural change and could be thought of as a G fú L
sequence of “regimes” over time. To do that consider joint sequences of   generated (xt,gt)0X×G
under a probability P over the space  ((X×G)
4, B((X×G)
4)). The theorem below is stated under the
assumption that P is stationary although it is sufficient that it be stable. Now, let Pg  be a regular
conditional probability of x given g. That is 
Pg(S) : G
4×B(X
4) 6 [0, 1] ,     g0G
4 ,   S0B(X
4)
such that for each  S0B(X
4), Pg(S)  is a measurable function of  g  and for each g, Pg(•)  is a
probability on (X
4,B(X
4)). We now consider the data  as being generated under (xt ,t' 0,1,2,...)
the conditional probability Pg parametrized by g where one considers   as the parameters of the gt
regime in place at date t. The question we ask is under what conditions is the data generating
system under the probability Pg(•) stable for almost all parameter sequences g?
Before proceeding we pause and ask how we should think of the joint system? The joint
process on data and parameters could be considered in two ways. One is as a description of the way
our world evolves, inducing statistical regularity of the data generating process. The joint system is
then a true unobserved law of motion of our economy, the   are unobserved parameters and gt0G
the statistical properties of the parameters are interrelated with the statistical properties of the data.25
Both arise from the stability of the joint system. Or else, which is the way we use it here, the joint
process is a model which a rational agent uses to formulate his belief. The parameter   then pins gt
down the state of belief or the agent “type” at date t. 
To proceed we need two technical definitions. Let PX be the marginal measure of P on 
(X
4, B(X
4)) and PG be the marginal of P on (G
4, B(G
4)) defined by 
PX(S) = P(S × G
4)    for all    S 0 B(X
4)
PG(Y) = P(X
4×Y)    for all    Y 0 B(G
4).
Our perspective is then simple. The joint is a process on data and parameters under P but the data
 is generated under the conditional probability Pg parametrized by g. (xt ,t' 0,1,2,...)
Theorem 3:  (Conditional Stability Theorem, (Kurz and Schneider (1996)))  Suppose G is countable
and the probability P on ((X×G)
4, B((X×G)
4)) is stationary and ergodic then
(a) The conditional probability Pg  is stable and ergodic for P  a.a.  g. The stationary measure
of Pg  is denoted by  . m
Pg
(b)    is independent of g  P a.a  g. m
Pg
(c) m
Pg ' PX
A sufficient condition for stability and ergodicity of Pg is then the stability and ergodicity of
P. In addition to the stability of the conditional probability Pg we also have the result that the
stationary measure of  Pg is the marginal measure  PX. It is well known that for all SεB(X
4)  we have 
.  P(S×G4) '
m
G 4
Pg(S)PG(dg)
Hence, PX is computed by averaging the conditional probability Pg over frequencies at which it is
used, as is the case in Examples 1 and 2. 
The theorem defines a general family of probabilities that are rational beliefs relative to a
known m. That is, let the data be generated under a stable, ergodic but unknown probability Π with
a stationary measure  m. Now an agent formulates a joint process of   under probability P (x,g)
which induces, with parameters g, a belief  Pg on data sequences x. The question is then under what
conditions is  Pg  a stable and ergodic rational belief? Theorem 3 tells us that if the joint P is
stationary and ergodic then Pg is stable and ergodic with a stationary measure satisfying  . It m
Pg'PX8 As will shortly be explained, in many applications the dividend or payoff  Dt  grows without bound, does not have a
finite mean and has growth rates which have an empirical distribution characterized by a stationary transition of a Markov
process. The same applies to other statistically stable processes with trends, in which cases the concept of stability is applied to
growth rate data, not to the absolute quantities.
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is a rational belief if the joint satisfies  . The joint is then a model an agent uses to formulate PX ' m
his belief. Our development below is based on this way of constructing beliefs relative to a known
empirical probability m. But since we also assume Gaussian processes with a continuum of states,
we comment on Theorem 3's condition that G is countable. In general, Theorem 3 is false for
continuum state space without more restrictions. For Gaussian processes the theorem holds and one
can give a direct proof. A more general theorem is given by Nielsen (2007) for Harris Processes.
Theorem 3 offers a tractable way to describe beliefs about general asset structures. To
simplify exposition we concentrate in the rest of this Chapter on a simple asset structure. To that
end we postulate an exogenous environment in which there is a single risky asset or a single risky
portfolio of assets paying an exogenous risky payoff { } with a non-stationary and Dt,t'1,2,...
unknown true probability. We assume the available long history of the data reveals that the
empirical distribution of the  ‘s constitute a Markov process with transition Dt
8
Dt%1 ' μ % λd(Dt & μ) % ρ
d
t%1 , ρ
d
t%1 - N(0 , σ
2
d)
and unconditional mean μ. Let  then the process   is a zero mean, non- dt'Dt&μ dt,t'1,2,...
stationary with unknown true probability Π and empirical probability m. Hence, { } has dt,t'1,2,...
an empirical distribution which implies a transition function of the first order Markov process
(10a)  . dt%1 ' λddt % ρ
d
t%1 , ρ
d
t%1 - N(0 , σ
2
d)
Since the implied stationary probability is denoted by  m, we write  . E m[dt%1|dt] ' λddt
We also review papers which assume finite state spaces. In simulation work which study
volatility it is assumed   where vt is the random growth rate of dividends which is a Dt%1 ' vt%1Dt
Markov process over a finite state space. In studying the equity risk premium Mehra and Prescott
(1985) assume  vt  takes two values. They find the long term empirical distribution is represented by
a stationary and ergodic Markov process over a state space which reflect extreme business cycle
states of “recession” and “expansion.” They estimate the transition matrix of the two states to be
(10b) ,   φ = 0.43.   φ 1&φ
1&φφ
Is the stationary models (10a) or (10b) the true processes?  Those who believe the economy
is stationary would accept (10a) or (10b) as the truth. Most do not believe past empirical record is9 In using Theorem 3 there are two possible approaches that can be taken. The first is based on Nielsen (1996) who
treats the infinite sequence  gt of parameters as fixed and known to each agent in advance, as in Example 1. Hence, in Example
1 a belief is a Dirichlet distribution in ( ,B( )). In this Chapter we follow the developments in Kurz and Motolese (2001), G 4 G 4
Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2005a), (2005b) and Kurz and Motolese (2007) who treat the sequence gt as state variables which
define the belief of an agent or identify his type. These papers assume that at date t an agent does not know his own type at
date t+1.
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adequate to forecast the future and this leads to non-stationary and diverse beliefs. The problem is
then how do we describe an equilibrium in such an economy? The belief structure is our next topic. 
3.4 Individual and Market Beliefs as Markov State Variables
The approach taken by Theorem 3 raises a methodological question. In formulating an asset
pricing theory do we need to describe in detail each agent’s model? Are such details needed for a
study of price dynamics? Although an intriguing question, we suggest such details are not needed.
To describe an equilibrium all we need is to specify how beliefs affect agents’ perceived stochastic
transition of state variables. Once specified, Euler equations are well defined and market clearing
leads to equilibrium pricing. Theorem 3 leads to this approach by proposing to treat individual
beliefs as state variables, generated within the economy
9. This is the approach we now explain.
Start with the fact that agents who hold heterogenous beliefs are willing to reveal their
forecasts when surveyed. We thus assume that distributions of individual forecasts are publicly
observable. An individual’s belief is described with a personal state of belief which uniquely pins
down his perception of the transition to next period’s state variables. It follows that personal state
variables and economy-wide state variables are not the same. A personal state of belief is the same
as any other state variables in an agent’s decision problem but can also be interpreted as defining the
“type” of an agent who is uncertain of his future belief type but knows the dynamics of his belief
state. The distribution of belief states is then an economy-wide state variable. Endogenous variables
depend  upon the economy’s state variables. Hence, moments of the market distribution of beliefs
may have an effect on endogenous variables such as prices. Also, in a large economy an agent’s
“anonymity” means a personal state of belief is perceived to have a negligible effect on prices and is
assumed not to be public. Some papers assume an exponential utility which result in equilibrium
endogenous variables depending only on the mean market belief. Finally, in the discussion below
the set of agents is implicit and not specified: it may be finite or infinite. It is specified when needed. 28
3.4.1 Individual States of Belief
We introduce agent i’s state of belief at t    which pins down his transition functions. g
i
t
Apart from “anonymity” we assume agent R knows his own  and the distribution of the  over g
R
t g
i
t
the agents for all past dates  . This last assumption is justified by the fact that an infinite horizon τ # t
economy consists of a sequence of decision makers. An agent knows his states of beliefs but does
not know the states of belief of all his own specific predecessors. Past belief distributions are public
information since samples of   are made public. We specify the dynamics of   by    g
i
t g
i
t
(11) g
i
t%1 ' λZg
i
t % ρ
ig
t%1 , ρ
ig
t%1 - N(0 , σ
2
g)
where    are correlated across agents, reflecting correlation of beliefs across individuals. The state ρ
ig
t
of belief is a central concept and (11) is taken as a primitive description of type heterogeneity. One
can, however, deduce (11) from more elementary principles (see Section 3.4.2 below). 
 How does   pin down the stochastic transition? In various models agent i’s perception of g
i
t
date t distribution of   (denoted by  ) is described by using the belief state as follows dt%1 d
i
t%1
(12)   . d
i
t%1 ' λddt % λ
g
dg
i
t % ρ
id
t%1 , ρ
id
t%1 - N(0 , ˆ σ
2
d)
The assumption that   is the same for all  i  is made only for simplicity. An agent who believes the ˆ σ
2
d
empirical distribution is the truth expresses it by  . It follows that given information   the g
i
t ' 0 Ht
state of belief    measures the deviation of his forecast from the empirical stationary forecast  g
i
t
(13)  . E
i[d
i
t%1|Ht,g
i
t ] & E
m[dt%1 |Ht ]' λ
g
dg
i
t
(13) shows how   is measured in practice. For any  , publicly available data on i’s forecasts of  g
i
t xt
  measure   where h is the forecast horizon. To estimate the difference in (13) xt%h E
i[xt%h|Ht,g
i
t ]
one then uses standard techniques such as Stock and Watson (2001, 2002, 2005) to compute the
stationary forecast  . Average market belief is then computed by averaging the left hand E m[xt%h|Ht]
side of (13) over agents. Fan (2006) and Kurz and Motolese (2007) offer examples of such
construction. Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the time series of average market belief with horizon of  6
month for the 6 month Treasury Bill rate, for percent change in the GDP deflator (measuring
inflation) and growth rate of Industrial Production. For each variables the average forecasts are
given by the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts while  is computed by Kurz and Motolese E m[xt%h |Ht ]
(2007) using methods of  Stock and Watson (2001, 2002, 2005).
Figures 1, 2 , 3 Place Here
In Figures 1 and 3 average market belief fluctuates around zero as predicted by the theory even29
during the short period at hand. In Figure 2 this pattern is not exactly maintained by market belief
about inflation due to persistent deviations of inflation forecasts from the normal pattern during the
1980's and early 1990's. Over longer horizon the pattern of fluctuations around zero is restored. All
three figures are compatible with the Markov property assumed in (11) (and later in (15)).
Note that since belief variables arise from structural change,  in 1900 has nothing to do g
i
t
with the one in 2000: they reflect different social and technological environments. Also observe that
a belief   is not “information” about unknown structural parameter but rather, it describes the g
i
t
opinion of agent i. Hence, agents do not treat individual beliefs of others as information and even if
they observed them they do not deduce from them anything about unknown parameters.
3.4.2 Deducing the Dynamics of Individual Belief (11) from Bayesian Inference
Although (11) is a primitive, one may wish to deduce it from elementary principles. There
are many ways to do this and we review the approach of Kurz (2007). He shows how subjective
interpretation of data arises from public qualitative information which always accompanies the
release of quantitative data. To highlight this idea note first that a Markov property in (11) is not
surprising since Bayesian posteriors have a Markov form. This is not sufficient since if agents knew
that the dividend process has an unknown parameter b which takes the form 
dt%1 & λddt ' b % ρ
d
t%1 , ρ
d
t%1 - N(0 , 1
β
)
then a Bayesian posterior would be a convergent belief sequence. Hence, the key object is to
explain where the random term in (11) comes from. 
From (16a)-(16b) agents know   and Kurz (2007) assumes they also know that under the λd
true probability Π the transition of   is dt
(14) .   dt%1 & λddt ' bt % ρ
d
t%1 , ρ
d
t%1 - N(0 , 1
β
)
 are the unknown, exogenous time varying mean values of   and hence  are beliefs bt dt%1&λddt g
i
t
about  . Since there is no universal method to learn a sequence of parameters, Kurz (2007) bt
outlines a Bayesian updating procedure which is supplemented by subjective estimates of  dt%1&λddt
which are based on qualitative public information.  We start with the qualitative data.
 Qualitative data about all aspects of our economy are provided at all time and financial
markets pay a great deal of attention to them. Profit is just one number in a financial report which
covers many additional issues. Firms may announce new research projects, new organizational10 We use the notation   for the prior belief at date t about the unknown parameter   used to forecast E
i
t (bt|dt,Ψ
i
t) bt
. We then use the notation   for the posterior belief about   given the observation of   . Assumption dt%1 E
i
t%1(bt|dt%1,Ψ
i
t) bt dt%1
(A) will then use this posterior belief as a building block in the formation of the new prior  . E
i
t%1(bt%1|dt%1 , Ψ
i
t%1)
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structures or new products. Qualitative data are rarely comparable over time. For example, when a
firm starts research into a new topic, no past data exist on it. Qualitative information is modeled by
Kurz (2007) in the form of qualitative statements that can potentially impact future profits. The list
of statements may change with time and the impact on profits may be positive or negative. For each
statement a realization at t+1 may be a “success” or “failure” in its effect on profits. Agent i has
subjective maps from the list of potential successes or failures to potential future value of
. Finally, conditional on the statements, agent i  attaches subjective probabilities to (dt%1&λddt)
vectors of successes or failures and by taking expected value he makes a subjective estimate   of Ψ
i
t
.   varies with time since new statements are made each date. Since long term average (dt%1&λddt) Ψ
i
t
of   is zero, rationality requires the  to be zero mean random variables. We now (dt%1 & λddt) Ψ
i
t
examine an alternative Bayesian updating procedure for estimating the same quantity. 
Kurz (2007) starts the updating process by assuming that β in (14) is known. At first
decision date t (say, t = 1) an agent has two pieces of information. He observes   and receives dt
public qualitative information with which he assesses  . Without   his prior belief at t = 1 is Ψ
i
t Ψ
i
t
normal with mean b. However, to start the process he uses both sources to form a prior belief 
 about    (used to forecast  ). However, the changing parameter  bt  leads to a E
i
t (bt|dt,Ψ
i
t) bt dt%1
problem. When   is observed, agent i updates his belief to 
10 in a standard dt%1&λddt E
i
t%1(b t|dt%1,Ψ
i
t)
Bayesian procedure. But he needs an estimate of  , not of   . Hence, his problem is how to go bt%1 bt
from    to a prior  of  ?  Without new information his belief about   is E
i
t%1(b t|dt%1,Ψ
i
t)b t%1 bt%1
unchanged and   would be the new prior of  . This is his first estimate of  . E
i
t%1(bt|dt%1,Ψ
i
t) bt%1 bt%1
Next the agent observes the qualitative information released publicly before trading at t+1 which
provide an alternate subjective estimate  of  . Now the agent has two independent sources Ψ
i
t%1 bt%1
for belief about  :    and  . Kurz (2007) now assumes: bt%1 E
i
t%1(b t|dt%1,Ψ
i
t) Ψ
i
t%1
Assumption (A): Agent i uses a subjective probability   to form date t+1 prior belief defined by τ
. E
i
t%1(b t%1|dt%1,Ψ
i
t%1) ' (1&τ)E
i
t%1(b t|dt%1,Ψ
i
t) % τΨ
i
t%1 0<τ # 1
At t=1 it was assumed that the initial prior mean is  b, hence for consistency, if   is Normal then Ψ
i
t31
  for some  h. b1-N((1&τ)b%τΨ
i
1, 1
h
)
This assumption is the element that permits   to be upgraded into a prior belief at E
i
t%1(b t|dt%1,Ψ
i
t)
date t+1,  ,  before   is observed. The following result is then shown: E
i
t%1(b t%1|dt%1 , Ψ
i
t%1) dt%2
Theorem 4 (Kurz (2007)): Suppose  , i.i.d. and Assumption (A) holds. Then there Ψ
i
t - N(0 , 1
ν
)
exists a constant   such that for large t  the prior belief    is a Markov random 0<κ<1 E
i
t (bt|dt,Ψ
i
t)
variable and by identifying   and     we have that the dynamics (11) g
i
t 'E
i
t (bt|dt,Ψ
i
t) (1&τ)κ ' λZ
holds:  Assumption (A) implies (11).
Theorem 4 shows that as the length of the data increases with time, nothing new is learned. The
posterior fluctuates forever but its dynamic law of motion converges. That is, in the limit (11) holds
and any new data alter the conditional probability of agents, but do not change the law of motion of
. If τ = 0 the agent ignores all qualitative information and the posterior converges. But the results g
i
t
holds no matter how small τ is since even the slightest perturbation of the Bayesian updating
process cause it to fluctuate forever. This result is compatible with the work of Freedman (1963,
1965) who first demonstrated the general non-convergence of Bayesian posteriors in an i.i.d context
but when the parameter space is countable. The work of Acemoglu et. al. (2007) also relates to the
issue of diversity in a setting where the data does not permit an identification of the state. 
 
3.4.3 Individual Perceptions, Market Belief and Endogenous Amplification
We assume the market is large and anonymous and the distribution of beliefs is observable
hence its moments are known. Let   be the first moment and refer to it as “average Zt '
m
g
i
t di
market belief.” Due to correlation across agents averaging over the agents does not result in a
constant and the average    is a random variable, not a constant 0. Hence we have   εt '
m
ρ
ig
t di
(15) . Zt%1 ' λZZt % εt%1
Correlation of  across agents may exhibit non stationarity and that would be inherited by the  ρ
ig
t ε
process. The empirical distribution of the   process is denoted by a process  . If the   process is ε ρZ ε
stationary then  .  Since the Zt are observable, market participants have data on the joint εt ' ρ
Z
t
process   hence they know their joint empirical distribution. We assume this distribution is (d,Z)11 Earlier we stressed the notion of endogenous uncertainty as entailing excess price volatility due to the effect of
beliefs. The precise definition as given here was introduced in Kurz and Wu (1996) in the context of a General Equilibrium
model. Kurz and Wu (1996) define the term as a property of the price map which has multiple prices for the same exogenous
state. 
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described by the system of equations
     
(16a) dt%1 ' λddt % ρ
d
t%1
(16b) Zt%1 ' λZZt % ρ
Z
t%1
ρ
d
t%1
ρ
Z
t%1
- N
0
0
,
σ
2
d 0
0 σ
2
Z
' Σ , i.i.d.
 (16a)-(16b) is the first formal structure to explain the mechanisms of endogenous amplification of
volatility. We started with one exogenous shock and we find that correlation of beliefs expanded the
economy’s state space to include an aggregate market belief variable. If this variable affects prices it
causes endogenous amplification of market dynamics and volatility. Note that   does not arise Zt
from individual choice but rather, it is a market externality arising from the correlation of individual
beliefs. Indeed, in the theory reviewed here the emergence of the distribution of market belief as an
observable variables which has economic impact is the single most important development. But, to
demonstrate that amplification is actually present, one needs to show that equilibrium prices depend
upon market beliefs. This suggests a natural definition which is useful in assessing equilibria:
Definition 6: An economy exhibits endogenous uncertainty if an equilibrium price map is a function
of the market belief.
11 
We now explain agent i’s perception model. In (12)   pins down agent  i’s forecast of  g
i
t
. We now broaden this idea to a perception model of the two state variables  given d
i
t%1 (d
i
t%1 ,Z
i
t%1)
. Following Theorem 3 his belief takes the joint form  dt and Zt
(17a)             d
i
t%1 ' λddt % λ
g
dg
i
t % ρ
id
t%1
(17b)    . Z
i
t%1 ' λZZt % λ
g
Zg
i
t % ρ
iZ
t%1
ρ
id
t%1
ρ
iZ
t%1
ρ
ig
t%1
- N
0
0
0
,
ˆ σ
2
d ˆ σZd 0
ˆ σZd ˆ σ
2
Z 0
00 σ
2
g
' Σi
   
(17c) g
i
t%1 ' λZg
i
t % ρ
ig
t%1
 defines belief about  and (17a)-(17b) shows it pins down i’s perceived transition of g
i
t (dt%1,Zt%1)
. This simplicity ensures one state variable pins down agent i’s subjective belief hence (d
i
t%1,Z
i
t%1)
E
i
t
dt%1
Zt%1
& E
m
t
dt%1
Zt%1
'
λ
g
dg
i
t
λ
g
Zg
i
t
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We stress two facts. First, since market belief is shaped by correlation across individual
beliefs, it is a market externality which has implications to efficiency considerations. Second, from the
perspective of agents,   is an economy state variable like any other. But market belief may be Zt
wrong: as we have seen it forecasted more recessions than occurred. In contrast with asymmetric
private information models, agents do not use  to update beliefs about future exogenous variables: Zt
(17a) does not depend upon  . Agents do not view  as information about  since it is not a Zt Zt dt%1
“signal” about unobserved private information. They do consider   as “news” about what the market Zt
thinks about  But since t+1 prices depend upon t+1 market belief, in order to forecast future dt%1!
endogenous variables an agent must forecast future beliefs of other agents!
3.4.4 Rationality Conditions for the Gaussian Model
Theorem 3 gives general rationality conditions and we now explore the specific conditions
which must be satisfied by the perception models (17a)-(17c). We note first that some rationality
conditions have been already imposed. First, we argued that rational agents exhibit fluctuating beliefs
since a constant belief which is not the empirical probability is irrational. Second,  are required to g
i
t
have an unconditional zero mean since beliefs are all about deviations from empirical frequencies.
Third, any belief is a conditional probability of a stationary joint system. We now turn to (17a)-(17c). 
For (17a)-(17c) to be a rational belief it needs to induce the same empirical distribution of the
observables   as (16a)-(16b). In accord with Theorem 3, one then treats   symmetrically with (dt,Zt)g
i
t
other random variables and require that for (17a)-(17c) to be a rational belief we must have
(18)   Empirical distribution of process   = distribution of  
λ
g
dg
i
t %ρ
id
t%1
λ
g
Zg
i
t %ρ
iZ
t%1
ρ
d
t%1
ρ
Z
t%1
-N
0
0
,
σ
2
d,0 ,
0, σ
2
Z
, i.i.d.
To compute the implied statistics of the model we first compute the moment of the  . From g
i
t
(17c), the unconditional variance of    is    Hence, we have two sets of g
i
t Var(g
i)'σ
2
g/(1&λ
2
Z)
rationality conditions which follow from (18). The first arises from equating the covariance matrix
(i)   (ii)   (iii)  .
(λ
g
d)
2σ
2
g
1 & λ
2
Z
% ˆ σ
2
d ' σ
2
d
(λ
g
Z)
2σ
2
g
1 & λ
2
Z
% ˆ σ
2
Z ' σ
2
Z
λ
g
dλ
g
Zσ
2
g
1 & λ
2
Z
% ˆ σZd ' 09 It may appear that the empirical evidence consists of more than the moments of the data series as stipulated in
Section 3.1 and Definition 1. That is, one should look not only at the full data series but also at subsequences. Kurz (1994)
argues that economic time series have deterministic patterns in seasonal and cyclical frequencies and hence if these are cleaned
out so that we look at seasonally and cyclically adjusted data, then under ergodicity, with probability 1 the empirical
distribution along any subsequence over dates whose selection does not depend upon the observed data is the same as the
distribution along the entire sequence of data. Also, with finite data there are always infinite number of unobservable
subsequences. Hence, there are no new restrictions that can be deduced from looking at subsequences. See Dawid (1985) for
the Calibration literature view on the question of rationality conditions along subsequences.
10 States of belief are described either with finite or continuous state models. Continuous state models tend to be
more complex than discrete state models which are more tractable but the simulation results of the two models are essentially
the same. To avoid repetition we report later detailed results deduced only for the continuous state models. Since a reader may
find either one of these two more suitable for his\her application, we describe in the text the basic structure of both models.
Hence, upon first reading one may skip the sections on finite state modeling and study these only after covering the full
development of the continuous state models together with the numerical results of the simulations described later in Section 4.
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The second set arises from equating the serial correlations of the two systems
    (iv)     (v)  .   
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(i) -(iii) fix the covariance matrix in (17a)-(17c) and (vi)-(v) fix the serial correlation of  . An (ˆ ρ
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t ,ˆ ρ
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t )
inspection of (17a)-(17c) reveals the choice left for an agent are the two parameters  . But (λ
g
d,λ
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under the rational belief theory these are not free either since there are natural conditions they must
satisfy. First,   place two strict conditions on  : ˆ σ
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Finally, one needs to ensure the covariance matrix in (17a)-(17c) is positive definite. The following is
a sufficient condition
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The “free” parameters  are thus restricted to a narrow range which is empirically testable
9. (λ
g
d , λ
g
Z)
3.4.5 Comments on the Finite State Space Case
10. 
Much of the simulation work reported in Section 4 uses finite state space economies. For
example, Kurz (1997c), Kurz and Beltratti (1997), Kurz and Schneider (1996),  Kurz and Motolese
(2001), (2007), Motolese (2003), Nielsen (1996),(2003), Nakata (2007), and Wu and Guo (2003) all
use OLG models with two “dynasties” of finite lived agents in which each agent has, at each date, two35
belief  states. They assume the sequence of parameters gt
i are i.i.d with Q
i{gt
i = 1} = "i, but gt
1 and
gt
2 are correlated. This marginal distribution is fixed in the discussion below. The empirical
distribution of dividends is typically assumed Markov on two values   with a transition (d H ,dL)
matrix as in (10b). We use this matrix together with Example 2 to review the main ideas. 
Starting with the endogenous amplification effect note that although the exogenous Markov
dividend growth rate process takes two values, with two dynasties of agents each with 2 belief states
the economy’s state space is of dimension 8. That is, the economy has 4 market belief states defined
by possible values of the pair  and 8 economy-wide states defined by the identification: (g1 ,g2)
(19) .
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
]
d ' d H,g 1 ' 1, g2 ' 1
d ' d H,g 1 ' 1, g2 ' 2
d ' d H,g 1 ' 2, g2 ' 1
d ' d H,g 1 ' 2, g2 ' 2
d ' d L,g 1 ' 1, g2 ' 1
d ' d L,g 1 ' 1, g2 ' 2
d ' d L,g 1 ' 2, g2 ' 1
d ' d L,g 1 ' 2, g2 ' 2
The endogenous amplification in (19) induces an expansion of the state space and explains how
beliefs increase price volatility above the “fundamental” volatility of dividends. 
Under the assumptions of marginal Markov and i.i.d. distributions, the empirical distribution
of the 8 states is characterized by an 8×8 stationary transition matrix M. Hence, this matrix has two
important properties: the dividend transition matrix (10b) must be one marginal probability and the
unconditional belief probabilities Q
i{gt
i = 1} = "i must be the second marginal probabilities.
Denoting the multiplication  , it turns out that M must take the form  α[Mv,u]'[αMv,u]
(20) M '
φM(a) (1 & φ)M(a)
(1 & φ)M(b) φM(b)
where M(a)  and M(b)  are  4×4 matrices that take the form
 (21)   . M(a) '
a1 α1 & a1 α2 & a1 1 % a1 & α1 & α2
a2 α1 & a2 α2 & a2 1 % a2 & α1 & α2
a3 α1 & a3 α2 & a3 1 % a3 & α1 & α2
a4 α1 & a4 α2 & a4 1 % a4 & α1 & α2
M(b) '
b1 α1 & b1 α2 & b1 1 % b1 & α1 & α2
b2 α1 & b2 α2 & b2 1 % b2 & α1 & α2
b3 α1 & b3 α2 & b3 1 % b3 & α1 & α2
b4 α1 & b4 α2 & b4 1 % b4 & α1 & α2
n is due to dividends and  is due to individual beliefs. This leaves open a and b which reflect (α1,α2)36
correlation among beliefs and between dividend growth and beliefs. In an uncorrelated world
 for all i. If beliefs and dividend growth are uncorrelated a = b. Correlation does not ai ' bi ' 0.25
arise by individual choices, hence (a, b) reflect the externality of beliefs determined by social
interaction and communication. It is the crucial component of endogenous amplification of beliefs.  
Now use Theorem 3 and example 2 to define a Markov belief as a conditional probability
on the 8 states in (19), implied by a 16×16 matrix F which is a joint Q
i(s|g
i
t ,Ht),s'1,2,...,8,
probability on the 8 economy-wide states and the 2 individual belief states. By Theorem 3 (see also
Example 2) agent i is using two transition matrices , with a conditioning as follows: (F
i
1 ,F
i
2 )
F
i
v ' Q
i(C|g
i
t ' v,Ht)i f g
i
t ' vf o r i ' 1,2, v ' 1,2
and   is then the unconditional frequencies at which agents i uses matrix  . Since M is deduced αi F
i
1
from the data, rationality of belief requires the two pairs of matrices to satisfy the conditions
(22)        for i = 1, 2. M ' αiF
i
1 % (1& αi)F
i
2
Keeping in mind that the empirical distribution is given to an agent, rationality implies that relative to
M an agent i can select only    since (22) implies that   . This imposes additional F
i
1 F
i
2 ' 1
1&αi
(M&αiF
i
1)
restrictions on   due to the non-negativity inequality conditions  . In sum we have F
i
1 M $ αiF
i
1
Theorem 5: In the case of two types, two states of belief and two state Markov process of the
dividend process the set of all rational beliefs relative to M  is characterized by the set of
and pairs of non-negative transition matrices   which satisfy (22). (0#α1#1,0 #α2#1) (F
i
1 ,F
i
2 )
But what are the matrices of the two agents? Since any two matrices    of agent i are (F
i
1 ,F
i
2 )
perturbations of M, there is a limited choice of matrices satisfying the inequalities   . In the M $ αiF
i
1
simulation models of asset volatility cited above researchers chose a simple formulation which permit
an agent to be either optimistic or pessimistic about the probability of high dividend states tomorrow.
To do that note that the first four rows and columns of M correspond to high dividend state and the
second four rows and columns to the low dividend state. Hence, the 4×4 matrix  would φχiM(a)
express optimism or pessimism by a factor χ
i, relative to  , in transition probabilities from a φM(a)
high dividend state today to a high dividend state tomorrow. For   to be a transition matrix one F
i
1
must also adjust the matrix  . For a specified parameter , and subject to the non- (1 & φ)M(a) 0#αi#137
negativity restrictions specified earlier, the following matrix is a rational belief which expresses
optimism (if  χ
i > 1) or pessimism (if χ
i < 1) in transition to high dividend state from all states today 
(23) F
i
1 '
φχ
iM(a) (1& φχ
i)M(a)
(1& φ)χ
iM(b) (1& (1& φ)χ
i)M(b)
In short, for a given  the set of rational beliefs of this form is summed up by one (0#α1#1,0#α2#1)
parameter   which varies over an interval defined by the inequality  . Now, if χ
i > 1 an agent χi M $ αiF
i
1
using   is optimistic about  : his conditional probability of   is higher than the stationary F
i
1 dt%1 dt%1'd H
probability implied by M. When this agent uses   his conditional probabilities of   are lower F
i
2 dt%1 ' d H
than the probability implied by M. The results of these studies are reported later. 
3.5 Asset Pricing with Heterogenous Beliefs: An Illustrative Model and Implications
Having outlined the structure of beliefs we now return to the infinite horizon model of Section
2.2 and adapt it to an economy with diverse beliefs but common information. Assume a continuum of
agents on [0,1] and an exogenous risky payoff process { } with an unknown stable and dt,t'1,2,...
ergodic probability Π and empirical distribution described by a transition   and where dt%1'λddt%ρ
d
t%1
 The asset structure of the economy consists of an aggregate stock index (think ρ
d
t%1-N(0,σ
2
d) , i.i.d.
of it as the S&P500) and a risk free bond. We assume the riskless rate r is constant over time and
positive hence R = 1 + r > 1 and  . Agent i borrows the amount  at t and receives with 0< 1
R
<1 B
i
t
certainty  at t+1. At date t  agent i buys    shares of stock and receives dividend   for B
i
t R θ
i
t Dt'dt%μ
each  held. Consumption is then standard:  . Equivalently, θ
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t
we define wealth   and derive the familiar transition for wealth W
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t %θ
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tpt%B
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t
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 is excess returns per share. For initial values  the agent maximizes the expected utility  πt (θ
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0 )
 (25)       E
i
t
(θi,ci)
[j
4
s' 0
&βt%se
&(γc
i
t%s) |H t]
subject to transitions (17a)-(17c) of the state variables  .    is date t information.  ψ
i
t'(1,dt,Zt,g
i
t )H t
Our assumptions are restrictive. Constant R is not realistic and exponential utility exhibits no
income effects. Nevertheless, these assumptions have the great advantage of leading to closed form38
solutions which are helpful vehicles to explain the main ideas. Hence the term “illustrative” in this
Section’s title. To seek a closed form solution we conjecture prices are linear in the economy’s state
variables hence equilibrium price   is conditionally normally distributed. In Theorem 4 below we pt
confirm this conjecture. For an optimum (for details see the Appendix of Kurz and Motolese (2007))
there exists a constant vector  u so the demand functions for the stock is 
(26)   θ
i
t(pt) ' 1
γRˆ σ
2
π
[E
i
t (πt%1) % uψ
i
t],u '(u0,u1,u2,u3),ψ
i
t ' (1,dt,Zt,g
i
t )
 is an adjusted conditional variance (the “adjustment” is explained in Section 4.3) of excess stock ˆ σ
2
π
return   which is assumed to be constant and the same for all agents. The term   is the πt%1 uψ
i
t
intertemporal hedging demand which is linear in agent i’s state variables.
For an equilibrium to exist we impose stability conditions on the dynamics of the economy: 
Stability Conditions: We require that      .  (i) 0 < λd < 1 , (ii) 0 < λZ % λ
g
Z <1
(i) requires that {dt, t = 1, 2, ...} is dynamically stable and (ii) requires dynamic stability of belief. It
requires the market, on average, to believe  is stable. To see why, first define (dt ,Z t)
Definition 7: The average market belief operator is  . ¯ Et(C) '
m
E
i
t (C)di
Now take expectations of (17b), average over the population and recall that  Zt  are averages of  . g
i
t
This implies that 
. ¯ Et[Zt%1] ' (λZ % λ
g
Z)Zt
Kurz (2007) and Kurz and Motolese (2007) then demonstrate the following results: 
Theorem 6: Consider the model with heterogenous beliefs under the stability conditions specified
with supply of shares equals 1. Then there is a unique equilibrium price function which takes the form 
(27a)   pt ' addt % azZt % P0
with coefficients
 (27b)     .  ad '
λd % u1
R & λd39
 (27c)      az '
(ad % 1)λ
g
d % (u2 % u3)
R&(λZ%λ
g
Z)
 (27d)    . P0 '
(μ % u0)
r
&
γ ˆ σ
2
πR
r
The linearity of the price thus confirms the earlier conjecture that the price is conditionally normal.
Now, closed form solutions for the hedging demand parameters   are not available u'(u0,u1,u2,u3)
hence Kurz and Motolese (2007) compute numerical Monte Carlo solutions. For all values of the
model parameters they find   which imply (i) ad > 0, (ii)  and (iii) az > 0. u1'0( a d % 1)λ
g
d % (u2 % u3)>0
These conclusions are reasonable: today’s asset price increases if  or   rise. The conclusion  dt Zt u1'0
says individuals have no hedging demand for dividends and this result is reasonable since   is u1'0
compatible with the fact that individual expected excess returns are independent of dividend states.
To see why compute i’s perceived excess returns. From (27a) and (17a)-(17c) we have
. E
i
t (πt%1) ' [(ad%1)(λddt%λ
g
dg
i
t ) % az(λZZt % λ
g
Zg
i
t )%μ%P0&Rpt]
By (27a)   hence, collecting the dividend term in excess return we find it is Rpt ' R[addt % aZZt % P0]
. But by  (27b) we also find that  . These two results together (ad % 1)λd & Rad (ad % 1)λd & Rad ' u1
show that u1 = 0 implies   hence there is no covariance between dividend and (ad % 1)λd & Rad ' 0
excess returns. In short, this argument shows that the combination of u1 = 0 and no covariance
between dividend and excess return is a solution. What does it say about the hedging demand?
Standard thinking about hedging demand leads one to focus on the dividend state as the only
relevant variable. In contrast, we have constructed a model where hedging demand due to dividend
information is zero and the key hedging demand is in response to market states of belief. The point of
the model is that agents do not believe excess returns are i.i.d. and this leads to a hedging demand for
the stock. But the non i.i.d. of excess return is not due to the dynamics of the dividend states but to
market beliefs which also have a drastic effect on the risk premium. In more general models there may
be a hedging demand due to dividend states but in the present case this demand is absent because of
the absence of income effects. Here, investors hedge only against future market beliefs.
Our main objective now is to assess the implications of theory to the effects of diverse
rational beliefs on asset market dynamics.  We do it in two ways. First, we use the closed form
solution of the illustrative model as a simple reference. Second, we use the developments up to now
together with a citation of other papers which develop results on the questions at hand. we devote the40
rest of this section for a discussion of such implications of the theory.
3.5.1 Endogenous Uncertainty
The most direct implication of the theory is that asset markets are subject to endogenous
uncertainty. To explore Definition 6 we examine the price map   and find that pt'addt%azZt%P0
endogenous uncertainty is expressed in two ways. First the term   says that the risk of asset returns Zt
are, in part, due to the risk of future market belief. By (16a)-(16b), in the long run σ
2
p ' a
2
dσ
2
d % a
2
zσ
2
Z
hence price volatility is caused by exogenous as well as endogenous forces and this has far reaching
implications to market efficiency, to risk premia, to public policy etc. Second, examination of the
constant shows that  . Kurz (2007) shows that, apart from second order P0 ' (μ % u0 & γˆ σ
2
πR)/r
terms, the variance in P0 can be approximated by    . These are ˆ σ
2
π – (ad % 1)
2ˆ σ
2
d % 2(ad % 1)azˆ σZd % a
2
Zˆ σ
2
Z
terms from the covariance matrix in the agent belief (17a)-(17c) hence they depend upon perception
rather than on the actual empirical moments in (16a)-(16b). But as the perceived volatility of dividend
and average market belief increases, the price declines. We show in the next section that this fact
implies an increased risk premium.
The presence of endogenous uncertainty in asset markets has far reaching implications to
asset pricing theory and market dynamics and we note a few of these general conclusions: 
• An asset’s price is not equal to a unique fundamental value determined by the flow of future
payoffs. Moreover, market belief about exogenous states matters since it is often wrong,
hence market belief is an independent and dominant component of asset price volatility.
• Moral hazard and the large dimension of market belief make it impossible for markets to trade
contracts contingent on market belief, hence markets are fundamentally incomplete.
• In scales of days or weeks changes in productivity, growth and profits are slow. Hence, it is
absolutely clear without much formal analysis that most volume of trading results from
changes in the market distribution of beliefs. Indeed, over the short run the key function of
asset markets is to permit agents to trade their belief differences.
• Expected individual excess returns and “efficient frontiers” are both subjective concepts.
Hence, in markets with diverse beliefs most predictions of CAPM theory do not hold. 
• By anonymity of individuals the market belief is a public externality and hence subject to the41
effect of coordination and public policy. Stabilization policy can thus have a strong effect on
market volatility and this carries over to monetary economies as well.
   
3.5.2  The Endogenous Uncertainty Risk Premium
We now turn to an exploration of the risk premium under heterogenous beliefs in the
illustrative model of Section 3.5. and we review results in Kurz and Motolese (2007). Recall that the
premium on a long position, as a random variable, is defined by
(28)          .
πt%1
pt
'
pt%1 % dt%1 % μ & Rpt
pt
We seek a measure of the premium as a known expected quantity recognized by market participants
but we have a problem since with diverse beliefs the premium is subjective. From (27a)-(27d) we
compute three equilibrium measures to consider.  One is the subjective expected excess returns by i,
(28a) . E
i
t (πt%1) ' (ad%1)(λddt%λ
g
dg
i
t ) % az(λZZt % λ
g
Zg
i
t )%μ%P0&Rpt
Aggregating over i we define the market premium as the average market expected excess returns. It
reflects what the market expects, not necessarily what the market gets:
(28b) ¯ Et(πt%1) ' (ad%1)(λddt%λ
g
dZt) % az(λZZt % λ
g
ZZt)%μ%P0&Rpt
(28a) and (28b)  are not necessarily “correct” and we focus on a third, objective, measure which is
common to all. Econometricians who study the long term time variability of the premium measure it
by the empirical distribution of (28) which, by (27a)-(27d) and (16a)-(16b),  is
(28c) . E
m
t [πt%1] '' (ad%1)(λddt)%azλZZt %μ%P0&Rpt
(28c) is the common way all researchers cited above have measured the risk premium and therefore
we refer to it as “the” risk premium. 
We thus arrive at two conclusions. First, the differences between the individual perceived
premium and the market perceived premium is
(29a) . E
i
t [πt%1] & ¯ Et[πt%1] ' [(ad%1)λ
g
d% azλ
g
Z](g
i
t & Zt)
From the perspective of trading, all that matters is the difference   of individual from market g
i
t & Zt
belief. In addition, the following difference is important
(29b) . E
m
t [πt%1] & ¯ Et[πt%1] '&[(ad%1)λ
g
d% azλ
g
Z]Zt
The risk premium is different from the market perceived premium when  Zt …0. But the important
conclusion is the analytical expression of the risk premium:42
(30) E
m
t [πt%1] ' (γRˆ σ
2
π & u1dt) & az(R& λZ)Zt
Since az > 0,   R > 1 and   it follows that the premium per share declines with  . We then have λZ <1 Z t
Theorem 7: The Risk Premium   is increasing in the variance   and decreasing in the mean E
m
t [πt%1]ˆ σ
2
π
market belief  . Zt
Theorem 7 exhibits what Kurz and Motolese (2007) call “The Market Belief Risk Premium.” It
shows that the risk premium depends upon market belief in two ways:
(i) A direct effect on the permanent mean premium  . We have seen that the variance is γRˆ σ
2
π
approximately   hence it increases with the perceived ˆ σ
2
π • (ad % 1)
2ˆ σ
2
d % 2(ad % 1)azˆ σZd % a
2
Zˆ σ
2
Z
volatility of dividend and of the volatility of average market belief. 
(ii) An effect on the time variability of the risk premium, expressed by    with a & az(R& λZ)Zt
negative sign when Zt > 0. 
To understand the second result note that it says that if one runs a regression of excess returns on the
observable variables, the effect of the market belief on excess return is negative. From an REE
perspective this sign is somewhat surprising since when Zt > 0 the market expects above normal
future dividend but instead, the risk premium on the stock declines. When the market holds bearish
belief about dividends ( Zt < 0) the risk premium rises. This requires some further explanation.
Why is the effect of  Zt on the risk premium negative? The result shows that when the market
holds abnormally favorable belief about future payoffs of an asset the market views the long position
as less risky and the risk premium on the long position of that asset falls. Fluctuating market belief
implies time variability of risk premia but fluctuations in risk premia are inversely related to the degree
of market optimism about future prospects of asset payoffs.
To further explore the result, it is important to explain what it does not say. One might
interpret it as confirming a common claim that in order to maximize excess returns it is an optimal
strategy to be a “contrarian” to the market consensus by betting against it. To understand why this is
a false interpretation note that when an agent holds a belief about future payments, the market belief
does not offer any new information to alter the individual’s belief about the exogenous variable. If the
agent believes that future dividends will be abnormally high but  , the agent does not change his Zt <043
forecast of future dividends. He uses the market belief information only to forecast future prices of an
asset. Hence, Zt is a useful input to forecasting returns without changing the forecast of  . Given dt%1
the available information an optimizing agent is already placed on his demand function defined relative
to his own belief, hence it is not optimal for him to just abandon his demand and adopt a contrarian
strategy. This argument is the same as the one showing why it is not optimal to adopt the log utility as
your own utility even though it maximizes the growth rate of your wealth. Yes, it does but you dislike
the sharp expected declines in the values of your assets. By analogy, following a “contrarian” policy
may imply a high long run average return in accord with the empirical probability m. However, if you
disagree with this probability you will dislike being short when your true optimal position is to be
long. Indeed, this argument explains why most people hold positions which are in agreement with the
market belief most of the time instead of betting against. The crucial observation to make is that a
maximizing agent has his own belief about future events, and he does not select a new belief when he
learns the market belief. From his point of view the market belief is an important state variable used to
forecast future prices. When it is wrong, the market may forecast a recession that never arrives.
Theorem 7 was derived for an exponential utility function. Kurz and Motolese (2007) show
this result is more general and depends only on the positive coefficient  az  of   in the price map. For Zt
more general utility functions they use a linear approximation to show that the result depends only on
the condition that the slope of the stock price is positive with respect to  . This condition requires Zt
the current stock price to increase if the market is more optimistic about the asset’s future payoffs.  
Finally, Kurz and Motolese (2007) use data compiled by the Blue Chip survey of forecasts in
order to test the theory proposed in (35b). They report that the data support the theoretical results.
3.5.3 Rational Overconfidence
Evidence from the psychological and behavioral literature (e.g. Svenson (1981), Camerer and
Lovallo (1999), Russo and Schoemaker (1992)) shows a majority of individuals assess their own
probability of success in performing a task (investment, economic decisions, driving, etc.) above the
empirical frequency of success in a population. Hence a majority of people often expect to
outperform the empirical frequency measured by the median or mean. In a rational expectations
paradigm individuals know the true probability of success hence the observed inconsistency is taken
to be a demonstration of irrational behavior. Indeed, inconsistency between individual assessments44
and empirical frequencies has been cited extensively as a “proof” of irrational behavior and in support
of behavioral\psychological impulses for belief and forecasting. This phenomenon has thus been called
“overconfidence.” We reject this conclusion and show it reveals a fundamental flaw.  
The work cited above (and other empirical and experimental work) provides evidence against
rational expectations. But rational expectations is an extreme theory in demanding agents to know
the full structure of the economy and make exact probability assessments. Behavioral Economics
takes the other extreme view and assumes people are irrational and motivated by psychological
impulses. Hence, a rejection of rational expectations does not imply acceptance of irrationality of
agents. Indeed, one may reject these two extreme perspectives by observing the fact that most people
do the best they can, given the limited knowledge they have. Rational people do not know everything
and make “mistakes” relative to a true model they do not know. The theory of rational beliefs rejects
both extremes in favor of an intermediate concept of rationality. We then show “overconfidence” is
compatible with rational beliefs and, indeed, agents who hold rational belief will universally exhibit
“rational overconfidence.” Hence, the cited empirical evidence is no proof people are irrational and
motivated by pure psychological factors.
 We explain the above by using Example 1 (also, see Nielsen (2006)). A group of gamblers
look at the black box in Example 1 and form beliefs using different sequences g= (g0, g1,...) as in that
Example. Each belief is then defined by a sequence of independent random variables satisfying (9a).
Gamblers vary with the sequences g they use. A survey is taken and the distribution of beliefs is
publically announced. Hence, belief distributions of past gamblers are known but not their individual
beliefs. Since (1/3)(0.60) + (2/3)(0.45) = 0.50,  all are rational beliefs for almost all g.  In the rational
beliefs literature the ratio 1/3 is referred to as the “frequency” of optimism. When the frequency of
bull and bear states is not the same we have a market asymmetry between them. The probability 0.60
is the “intensity” of optimism when optimistic. In defining a rational belief these characteristics are
selected separately: for each frequency there is a range of feasible intensities which are rational.
The gamblers decide at date t-1 on how they want to bet.  They can gamble $1 on vt = 1 or on
vt = 0: they win $1 if they are right and they lose $1 if they are wrong. Being a small bet they will all
bet. Those who put money on 1 expect to win with a probability 0.60 and those who put their money
on 0 expect to win with probability 0.55. They are all overconfident and rational! The constancy of 
the high (0.60) and low (045) probabilities is not essential since we can, instead, put in any sequences45
of parameters which converge to 0.50 from above and from below and the result is the same.  
Observe that in this example all deviations from empirical frequencies lead to optimal behavior
which exhibits universal overconfidence. When a subjective probability is above the empirical
frequency a long position is optimally taken with overconfidence. When a probability is below the
empirical frequency a short position is optimally held with overconfidence. Hence, all agents are then
optimally overconfident at all time. 
Generalizing the example is natural. If y is an observed measure of success in an activity we
can define, as in (22d), a measure for i’s belief about future y. Beliefs are all about deviations from
empirical frequencies on the basis of which economic decisions are made. Optimistic agents engage in
taking the risk of success in that activity and pessimistic agents engage in gambles against success. If
they cannot gamble against it (e.g. short positions are not allowed) they refrain from participation.
This type of behavior is then natural to the rational belief paradigm. Moreover, this behavior is
natural to any complex environment in which aggregation of subjective probability beliefs of agents
may not be equal to the empirical frequencies. But then all creative work and all innovative decisions
are based on beliefs which exhibit “overconfidence.” Indeed, one can hardly think of entrepreneurship,
inventive activity and any speculative behavior without beliefs which exhibit rational overconfidence.
3.5.4 Properties of Average Market Belief and Higher Order Beliefs.
By (17a)-(17b) and Definition 7 it follows that
 (31)  ¯ Et
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and (31) exhibits the dynamics of the average market belief operator. However, (17a)-(17c) also
show that properties of conditional probabilities do not apply to the market belief operator   since ¯ Et(C)
it is not a proper conditional expectation. To see why let   be a space where  take X'D×Z (dt,Zt)
values and G
i  be the space of  . Since i conditions on  , his unconditional probability is a measure g
i
t g
i
t
on the space  where ö
i is a sigma field. The market conditional belief operator is ((D×Z×G i)4,öi)
just an average over conditional probabilities, each conditioned on a different state variable. Hence,
this averaging does not permit one to write a probability space for the market belief. The market
belief is neither a probability nor rational! This is then formulated (see Kurz (2007)) as46
Theorem 8 : The market belief operator violates iterated expectations:  . ¯ Et(dt%2) … ¯ Et¯ Et%1(dt%2)
Our earlier comment about the importance of the treatment of market belief as a state variable with
independent dynamics is now complemented by Theorem 8. Market belief is an externality which does
not arise from rational social choice of a collective actor. It cannot arise in a model of intertemporal
choice of a single representative agent.
 Turning to higher order beliefs, one must distinguish between higher order beliefs which are
temporal and those which are contemporaneous. (17a))-(17c) defines agent i’s belief over future
sequences of   and as is the case for any probability, it implies i’s temporal higher order (dt,Z t,g
i
t )
belief with regard to future events. For example, one deduces from (17a))-(17c) statement like
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Properties of temporal higher order beliefs are thus familiar properties of conditional expectations. 
As to market belief, since (15) is implied by (17c), the average market belief operator satisfies
. One deduces perceived higher order temporal market beliefs by ¯ Et(dt%N%1)'λd¯ Et(dt%N)%λ
g
d¯ Et(Zt%N)
averaging over  i. For example,
(33) . λ
g
dλZ¯ Et(Zt%N) ' ¯ Et¯ Et%N%1(dt%N%2) & ¯ EtE
m
t%N%1(dt%N%2)
Contemporaneous higher order beliefs have attracted attention (e.g. Allen, Morris and Shin
(2006), Bacchetta, and van Wincoop (2005) and Woodford (2003)) despite being unobservable. They
occur naturally in strategic situations. In a market context they can formally arise in (17a))-(17c) as
follows. Let   in (15) be defined as  . One may argue that agents may form beliefs about the Zt Z
1
t
future of this variable by using a second belief index   about   whose transition would be g
i2
t Z
1
t%1
deduced from the transition of  . Now  would be a second order aggregate belief for g
i2
t Z
2
t '
m
g
i2
t di
which a third belief index  could be introduced, whose average would be  , etc. Such infinite g
i3
t Z
3
t
regress is problematic and leads us to reject contemporaneous higher order beliefs in markets for two
reasons. First, higher order beliefs are degenerate in (17a))-(17c) because the single belief index g
i
t
fully pins down agent i’s belief.  Moreover, since agents know the beliefs of others and all variables in
the price map (which embody the beliefs of others), there is nothing else to form beliefs about. A
second and more general reason for why, in markets, all higher order beliefs   are Z
j
t , forj>1
degenerate. This is so since they are averages of    and since for j >1 the  are not observable, g
ij
t Z
j
t
they can only exist in the minds of the agents and hence there is no possible mechanism for individual47
to be correlated as in (15). Hence, higher order beliefs cannot have an aggregate effect since with g
ij
t
independent   the averages  for   are zero at all t.  g
ij
t Z
j
t j>1
3.5.5  On Beauty Contests
The Keynes Beauty Contest metaphor has been extensively discussed. Some have associated it
with asset pricing equilibrium where the price is expressed as iterated expectations of average market
belief of the future fundamental value of the asset. In (8) we presented the Allen Morris and Shin
(2006) example of such pricing with private information. But this interpretation should be questioned.
An examination of Keynes’ view (see Keynes (1936), page 156) shows that the crux of Keynes’s
conception is that there is little merit in using fundamental values as a yardstick for market valuation.
Hence what matters for the asset demand of an agent is the perception of what the market believes
the future price of that asset will be rather than what the intrinsic value is. Keynes insists future price
depends upon future market belief and that may be right or wrong without a necessary relation to an
intrinsic fundamental value. The Beauty Contest parable is thus simple: a price does not depend upon
an intrinsic value but upon what the market believes future payoffs and valuations will be. Keynes’
Beauty Contest is thus a statement that in order to forecast the price in the future an individual must
forecast the future market state of belief, when such forecasts may be “right” or “wrong.” We now
observe that a rational belief equilibrium captures the essence of the Keynes Beauty Contest.
To explain we make two observations. From (27a) equilibrium price is   and pt'addt%azZt%P0
this is clearly in accord with the above: in any model of the “Beauty Contest” equilibrium price
should not depend upon a true intrinsic value but rather, it should depend upon market belief. It
follows from the rationality conditions that price\earning ratios exhibit fluctuations with reversion to
the long run stationary mean but such long term value is not an intrinsic fundamental value. Indeed, in
a model with diverse belief there is no such thing as fundamental intrinsic value since all prices depend
upon market belief. Second, to forecast future prices an agent forecasts  which is the market belief Zt%1
tomorrow. From (17b) we have   which means that an agent forecasts the Z
i
t%1 ' λZZt % λ
g
Zg
i
t % ρ
iZ
t%1
future market belief with his own subjective model. In sum, this equilibrium concept reflects the
Beauty Contest parable because the price map depends upon market beliefs, not upon some agreed
upon intrinsic value, and to forecast future prices agents must forecast the belief of others.48
3.5.6 Speculation
Although market practitioners have an intuitive idea of what “speculation” is, there is no
scientific consensus on how to define this concept.  Keynes (1936) viewed asset markets as a “Beauty
Contest” and many writers have interpreted this to be a form of speculation. A different perspective
was proposed by Kaldor (1939) who define speculation as “the purchase (or sale) of goods with a
view to resale (repurchase) at a later date.” It is clear that for such asset trades to make sense, prices
of assets must regularly deviate from their fundamental values and agents must believe prices are, or
will not equal their fundamental values. It is also clear that in a perfect REE world with homogenous
beliefs and complete information a Kaldor speculation is not possible (e.g. see Tirole (1982), Milgrom
and Stokey (1982)). Here we explore the perspective of a diverse belief equilibrium with respect to to
Kaldor (1939) speculation. 
Following the definition of Kaldor (1939), Harrison and Kreps (1978) study the consequences
of risk-neutral investors having different beliefs about the dividend process of a risky asset. At date t,
investor i can expect a payment    if he chooses to resell k periods later, E
i
t (βkpt%k % 3
k
s'0
βs(dt%s % μ))
where {pt} and β denote the stock price process and the discount rate. The equilibrium market price,
called a consistent price scheme, is the supremum over all stopping times k and across all investors.
That is, this price is 
pt ' maxi supk E
i
t (βt%k pt%k % 3
k&1
s'0
βt%s (dt%s %μ)).
Agents hold diverse beliefs and are assumed to have infinite wealth for each class of investor type. A
speculative premium is then defined to be the difference between the consistent price scheme and the
value,   expected when all investors are obliged to hold the asset forever. maxi E
i
t ( 3
4
s'0
βt%s(dt%s % μ)),
Harrison and Kreps (1978) show that under the assumptions made there exists a positive speculative
premium, or a price bubble, when  short sales are not allowed. 
Morris (1996) further examines asset pricing during initial public offerings when investors
have different prior distributions, but the difference of beliefs disappears as investors learn from
observations. A major weakness of both the works of Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Morris (1996)
is their assumption of the unrestricted heterogeneity of beliefs.
Wu and Guo (2003) use the theory of rational belief to explain the persistence of diverse
beliefs in the Harrison and Kreps (1978) model and to narrow down the equilibrium results.  They
adopt the finite state Markov assumption for dividend and the two state of belief model. Wu and Guo49
(2003) then show that in contrast with the complex solution of Harrison and Kreps (1978) a rational
belief equilibrium price vector (over states) is a simple expression which is computed via a finite
algorithm. As to dynamics they show that speculative bubbles and endogenous uncertainty emerge.
They further characterize how the speculative premium increases with the degree of heterogeneity.
To explore the phenomenon of simultaneous increase in asset prices and trading volume, Wu
and Guo (2004) study a model of heterogeneous rational beliefs held by a continuum of agents on the
unit interval, as in Miller (1977). In contrast with Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Morris (1996), Wu
and Guo (2004) permit limited short sales and impose a wealth constraint of a finite investment fund.
They assume an i.i.d. dividends process over two states and arrange investors in the order of their
optimism along the unit interval.  They then derive a steady state rational belief equilibrium price and
show that in equilibrium optimistic investors hold the entire supply. In this framework, Wu and Guo
(2004) demonstrate the emergence of endogenous uncertainty with a positive speculative premium
which increases with the size of the investment fund and degree of optimism, and decreases with the
size of short sale constraint. Furthermore, the model generates a positive relationship between trading
volume and the directions of price changes: volume is high when prices rise and it is low when prices
decline. Also a positive relationship between trading volume and price level. These results are
consistent with the empirical evidence (e.g. Karpoff (1987) and Basci et al. (1996)). 
4.  Explaining Market Dynamics with Simulation Models of Diverse Beliefs
4.1 Introduction: On Simulation Methods and the Main Results
Although much of our discussion is analytical, significant results about excess volatility are
deduced in models we review here from simulation models. Simulations require specification of
functions, parameters and beliefs, and show that a model replicates the statistics of the economy.
Since most models reviewed have only two agent types, the beliefs selected are representative of only
two classes of agents. Since one might question the validity of such approach as too narrow, it is
useful to explain the common features of all simulation models reviewed which replicate the dynamics
of real markets we observe. Our view on this issue is simple: a simulation model is a very good tool
to explore the impact of the qualitative features of feasible belief structure on market volatility. The
specific parameter configurations used to attain these qualitative features are less important.
The best way to explain the above view is to highlight the central conclusions of the work we50
review below and the summation of Kurz et al. (2005a) is useful. This paper starts from the view that
in any non REE based asset market theory there are basically two natural individual states one can
have: optimistic (i.e. bull states), and pessimistic (i.e. bear states). The authors then explain that given
these two basic states there are three central characteristics of individual beliefs which fully account
for all characteristics of market volatility and risk premia observed in real markets. These are:
(A) large (i.e. high intensity) fat tails in the belief densities of agents;
(B) asymmetry in the proportion of bull and bear states in the market over time;
(C) belief states are correlated resulting in regular joint dynamics of belief distributions.  
Large fat tails means the densities of the agents’ beliefs have very fat tails. “Intensity” measures size
of deviations from stationary probabilities as in the review of Rational Overconfidence. The
asymmetry in the time frequency of belief states needed to reproduce the results is a subtle feature
which says that on average, agents are in bear states at more than 50% of the dates. Equivalently, on
average, at more than half of the time agents do not expect to make above normal returns on their
investments. Therefore, it follows from the rational belief principle that when agents are in bull states
and expect above normal returns, their expected excess returns must be very high. We shall see later
that this asymmetry is empirically supported by the fact that major abnormal rises in stock prices
occur over a relatively small fraction of time.  Hence, when agents believe a bull market is ahead, they
expect to make excess return in relatively short periods.
Correlation of beliefs is a market externality, not determined by individual choices, which
regulates the probability of agreement or disagreement of beliefs in the market and the transitions
among such states. This is central because the distribution of beliefs determines prices and returns,
and the dynamics of the belief distribution is crucially affected by the correlation. It is then natural that
asymmetry in the transitions is important since it regulates the dynamics of bear vs bull markets.
Kurz et al. (2005a) then make two observations. First, exactly the same simulation model used
to study market volatility is also used to study all other aspects of market dynamics. In that model
stock prices and returns exhibit a structure of forecastability observed in the real data. Also, the same
model implies that market returns exhibit stochastic volatility generated by the dynamics of the market
beliefs. Second, examination of alternative configurations of belief shows that no other configuration
of qualitative features than the three specified above yields predictions which simultaneously replicate
the empirical record.  Many feasible model parameters generate volatility of prices and returns but as11 Here again we present the parametrization of finite state and continuous state models. The empirical results
reported later are all deduced from the continuous state model hence it may be useful for the reader to skip, upon first reading,
material which pertains to finite state models. This material would be especially relevant if the reader wants to replicate any of
these results by visiting the web pages provided to download the programs with which to compute the solutions. It will be
found that the finite state models are much easier to handle.
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we move away from the three features, the model fails to generate some essential components of the
empirical record, frequently the riskless rate and the risk premium. Thus, the main reason why the
models are able to explain the empirical record is that they have the needed configuration of
qualitative factors. In each case they imply a unique parameter structure of the computational model
needed to explain the empirical record but the specific implied belief is not of central significance. 
4.2 Anatomy of Market Volatility
4.2.1 Understanding the Parametrized Structure of Beliefs
Papers on excess volatility simulate computed equilibria with finite or infinite belief states.
Those with finite belief states are OLG models while those with infinite belief states are infinite
horizon models. This division guides our review. Papers which fall into the first category (i.e. OLG)
include Nielsen (1996, 2003, 2005, 2006), Kurz (1997b), Black (1997, 2005), Kurz and Beltratti
(1997), Kurz and Motolese (2001), Kurz and Schneider (1996), Motolese (2003), Nakata (2007), Wu
and Guo (2003). Papers using infinite horizon models with infinite belief states include Kurz et al.
(2005a, 2005b), Kurz (2007), Kurz and Motolese (2007),and Guo and Wu (2007). 
We start by discussing OLG models with finite belief states and use the parametrization of 
Kurz and Motolese (2001) as a prototype
11. All models have two assets: a stock and a riskless bond.
The stock pays dividends with a two state growth rate. There are two types of agents, each living two
periods with a power utility function of agent i over consumption
  u(c
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t ,c
2
t%1)'[1/(1&γ)](c
1
t )
1&γ%[β/(1&γ)](c
2
t%1)
1&γ , γ>0,0<β <1 .
The belief structure is as in (20)-(23) with two states hence there are eight economy wide states.
Rational beliefs are represented by the two pairs of matrices  with frequencies . Since (F
i
1 ,F
i
2 )( α1,α2)
deviations from the long term mean growth rate of dividend could either be above it or below it, at
each date an agent must be either a bull or a bear about future growth of dividend. This is expressed
by a pair of parameters  which measure the intensity of optimism when in an optimistic state (χ1,χ2)
while  measure the frequency of each of the two agents being optimistic. (α1,α2)12 For details of the finite belief state results see Kurz and Motolese (2001) pages 530-533. For computational
procedures to reproduce these results go to  http://www.stanford.edu/~mordecai/  and click on “computable models with
heterogenous beliefs.” Keep in mind that an OLG model has a unique market oriented feature not shared by an infinite horizon
models which requires an agent to sell his position when old, regardless of his beliefs. This feature is important for a model of
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To see the implications note that    are revisions of the probabilities of states (1, 2, 3, 4) and χi
(5, 6, 7, 8) relative to M.    imply increased probabilities of (1, 2, 3, 4) in matrices   when the χi>1 F
i
1
first four prices occur at dt = d
H states. But these are actually states of high prices as well, hence    χi>1
implies agent i is optimistic about high prices at  t + 1.  In all simulations     hence one interprets χi$1
gt
i  so that gt
i > 0 means agent i  is optimistic (relative to M )  at  t  about high prices at t + 1. 
In the transition M, the matrices M(a) and M(b) regulate  the correlation across beliefs and the
effect of dividends on that correlation. This is a correlation externality given to agents which is the
same as the correlation among the   across i in (11), a correlation which gives rise to the dynamics ρ
ig
t
of the aggregate   in (15). The correlation is crucial but it turns out that it does not need to be Zt
complex. The case  ,  and  is the case of REE. Kurz and χ1'χ2'1 α1'0.50,α2'0.50 ai' bi' 0.25
Motolese (2001) postulate a simple model with M(a) = M(b) hence beliefs are not correlated with
dividends. However beliefs are correlated with a simple description of a = b = (.50 , .14, .14, .14).
This simple parametrization implies that the dynamics of prices have the feature that bull and bear
markets are asymmetric. For the market to transit from the “crash” state of the lowest price to the
states of the highest prices it must take several steps: it cannot go directly from the low to the high
prices.  The opposite is possible since at the bull market states there is a positive probability of
reaching the crash states in one step.  This implies that a bull markets which reaches the high prices
must evolve in several steps but a crash can occur in one step. 
To sum up, there are three classes of parameters and simulation work explores only regions of
the parameter space which are compatible with rationality. Kurz and Motolese (2001) report a set of
parameters under which the model replicates the empirical record with great accuracy. These are:
utility function parameters:  - the common risk aversion coefficient,  - 2.00# γ # 3.00 0,90 # β # 0.95
the common discount rate; correlation parameters:  ; belief parameters:  a1'a2'a3'0.50 , a4'0.14
 - the maximal intensity permitted by rationality,  - the frequency an χ1'χ2' 1.7542 α1'α2'0.57
agent is in an optimistic state. The model replicates well the empirical record and the results are
similar to those of infinite horizon models. Hence there is no point repeating the same results twice
and we report the precise numerical results only for the infinite horizon models
12. We thus turn tomarket volatility since agents who aim to preserve capital by holding a portfolio of a riskless asset must sell the asset into the
market regardless of their beliefs. This fact tends to generate additional volatility that would not be present in an infinite
horizon model. This feature has two results which are not shared by the infinite horizon model. First, the riskless rate has a
much larger standard deviation in simulated OLG equilibria than in the infinite horizon models. Second, in order to generate a
low average riskless rate, a result needed to replicating the 6%-7% equity premium, it is necessary to assume an asymmetry
where the majority of agents are optimists about earning abnormal excess returns and the frequency of optimism is greater than
50%. In the infinite horizon model it is necessary to have the pessimists in the majority with a frequency of pessimism being
more than 50%. We shall comment on this issue later again when we discuss the Equity Premium Puzzle.
13 Indeed, the main deficiency of the Kurz et al. (2005a) model is its complexity which, in our view today, could have
been avoided. Both the model itself as well as the computational procedures could have been drastically simplified since the
basic ideas are rather simple, as explained in Section 4.1.
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models with infinite belief states.
Models with infinite horizon and infinite belief states typically have two assets: a stock paying
dividends and a zero net supply bond. The model has a large number of identical agents of two types
with the same utility and endowment. Across types they differ in their beliefs. For consistency we use
a model developed by Kurz et al. (2005a) to illustrate the belief structure and report results fort this
simulation model. This has the merit that all simulation results reported are derived from a single
model. These authors assume   with an empirical distribution of the growth rate Dt%1 ' Dte
vt%1
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where v* is the unconditional mean. Given his belief, agent i maximizes an infinite horizon expected
utility with date t utility of   . To explain the perception models of the agents we β
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could have postulated   as in (17a). Such a model is sufficient for v
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the conceptual needs of the illustrative model but it would contradict the finite state model reviewed
earlier. The reason is that the belief state  is a symmetric variable which does not meet two of the g
i
t
three principles advocated earlier, namely the condition of asymmetry and fat tails in the belief
densities. Limited space permits us to present only a sketch of the complex structure in Kurz et al.
(2005a)
13. To introduce asymmetry and fat tails the procedure one follows is to transform the   into g
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One then looks for asymmetry and fat tails in the density of   , conditioned Δ
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on  . Keep in mind that for a computational model one must choose a specific functional form and g
i
t
this may appear to be too strong set of assumptions about beliefs. How do we know that belief
densities take these specific forms? We do not. But here we return to the three qualitative properties
discussed in Section 4.1. What drives the results are not the functional forms selected for a54
computational model but their qualitative properties. Any other functional form with the same
qualitative properties would generate the same results but, naturally, with different parametrization.
Since  cannot be a simple symmetric variable Kurz et al. (2005a) specify the conditional η
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distribution of  . They define it as a step function η
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where   and    (in (30)) are independent.   The functions   are defined by a η
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logistic function with two parameters  κ  and  Λ  
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The parameter  κ  measures asymmetry and the parameter Λ  measures intensity of fat tails in beliefs.
When   >  κ  then  . Choosing    implies that when   > κ agent i is in a bull g
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t Ei[η
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state and is optimistic about t+1 dividend growth being above normal.  Since  κ < 0  it also implies
that bull states occur with frequency higher than 50%.   “normal” is defined relative to the empirical
forecast.  In sum, for the basic case  : λ
g
v >0
• >   κ  means agent j is optimistic about profit growth and excess stock returns at t+1 g
i
t
• <   κ  means agent j is pessimistic about profit growth and excess stock returns at t+1. g
i
t
The parameter  κ  measures asymmetry and determines the frequency at which agents are bears and
when  κ < 0  the probability of g
i > κ  is more than 50%. The density of   is exhibited in Figure 4 η
i
t%1
and shows that asymmetry arises from a redistribution of the probability mass.  However, the
empirical distribution of    averaged over time and over the   is Normal η
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FIGURE 4 PLACED HERE
Each component of   is a sum of two random variables: one as in Figure 4 and the Δt%1(g
i
t )
second is normal.  In Figure 5 we draw two densities of  , each being a convolution of the two Δt%1(g
j
t )
constituent distributions.  One density for g
i > κ and a second for g
i < κ,  showing both have “fat
tails.”  Since  Λ  measures intensity by which the positive portion of the distribution in Figure 4 is
shifted, it measures the degree of fat tails in the distributions of  .   Δt%1(g
j
t )55
FIGURE 5 PLACED HERE
The assumption of a power utility  imply income effects matter and beliefs β
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do not aggregate. Hence, the state variable in the simulation model is the actual distribution of beliefs.
Since there is a large number of identical agents of two types this distribution is a vector  . (z
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forecast   as in (30) and  with a fully developed perception model which is analogous to vt%1 (z
1
t%1 ,z
2
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(17a)-(17c) in the illustrative model which we have developed here. For technical details of the
perception model and the implied rational belief restrictions, see Kurz et al. (2005a) pages 12-19. We
now turn to a detailed examination of the simulation results of the finite and infinite belief state model.
4.2.2 Explaining the Volatility Moments
We now report simulation results of models with infinite belief states. Please note that all
simulation results reported in this paper are derived from a single model by Kurz et al. (2005a). In
these simulations Kurz et al. (2005a) compute various measures of volatility by using 20,000
observations. Raw moment calculations were carried out by Kurz et al. (2005a) for the following list
of long term volatility measures which are moments in accord with the stationary measure:
    -    average price/dividend ratio; q
  -    standard deviation of the price/dividend ratio  ; σq qt
  -   average risky return on equity; R q
  -   standard deviation of    ; σR R q
r    -    average riskless rate of interest;
  -   the standard deviation of  r ; σr
  -   average the equity premium; ep
- correlation coefficient between stock returns and growth rate of dividends. Since ρ(d,R q)
consumption and divided are assumed to grow at the same rate,  is also the ρ(d,R q)
correlation coefficient between consumption growth and the risky rate;
 (Shrp) - the Sharp ratio .
Table 2 reports the results. The model matches simultaneously the moments and, as we see14  For computational procedures to reproduce the simulation results of Kurz et al. (2005a)  click on “computable
models with heterogenous beliefs” at the address  http://www.stanford.edu/~mordecai/  
15 The main data source for the empirical record is Shiller at  http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. It was
updated by Kurz et al.((2005a), page 23) to 1998. Since the discussion here does not aim to evaluate the precision of the
estimates, the numbers in the Table 2 were rounded off to indicate orders of magnitude. 
16  Shilling (1992) shows that during the 552 months from January 1946 through December of 1991 the mean real
annual total return on the Dow Jones Industrials was 6.7%.  However, if an investor missed the 50 strongest months the real
mean annual return over the other 502 months was -0.8%.   Hence the financial motivation to time the market is very strong, as
is the case with the agents in the model. 
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later, it also matches most other features of market dynamics. Kurz et al. (2005a) further observe that
the results in Table 2 are not due to the particular beliefs used or their parameter values. They are due
to fat tails in asset returns, to asymmetry and to correlation of beliefs as explained in (4.2.1). Are
these three key characteristics supported by the data?
                   Table 2: Simulation Results of Kurz et al. (2005a)
14
               (all moments are annualized)
Moment   Simulation Results Empirical Record
15
   (1889-1998)
q
σq
R q
σR
r
σr
ep
ρ(d,R)
Shrp
      25.54
        5.46
        7.57%
      18.81%
        1.08%
        5.44%
        6.49%
        0.21
        0.34
      25.00
        7.10
        7.00%
      18.00%
        1.00%
        5.70%
        6.00%
        0.10
        0.33
The fact that the distribution of asset returns exhibits fat tails is well documented (e.g. see
Fama (1965) and Shiller (1981)). It is natural to ask where these tails come from. The theory at hand
says they come from fat tails in the probability models of agents’ beliefs. Correlation of beliefs across
agents is documented in sources such as the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts. The evidence in support
of the hypothesis that the frequency of bear states is higher than 50% is more complicated.   
The hypothesis is supported by the empirical fact that, on average, most above normal stock
returns are realized over relatively small proportion of time when asset prices rally (see Shilling
(1992)). It is thus reasonable that, on average, the proportion of time when agents expect to make
above normal returns is less than 50%
16.  Additional indirect support comes from the psychological
literature which suggests agents place heavier weight on losses than on gains.  In the treatment here
agents fear losses at majority of dates since on those dates they place higher probabilities of57
abnormally lower returns.  By the rational belief principle, a higher frequency of bear states implies
that when in bull states, an agent’s intensity of optimism is higher than the intensity of pessimism. This
means  the average positive tail in the belief densities is bigger than the average negative tail.  That is,
the asymmetry hypothesis implies optimistic agents tend to be intense. Together with correlation of
beliefs across agents, this hypothesis also implies that we should  observe periods of high optimism
for a majority of agents.  Optimism leads to agents’ desire to borrow and finance present and future
consumption. At such dates the only way for markets to clear is by exhibiting sharp rises in stock
prices together with high borrowing rates.  Hence, this theory predicts we should expect to observe
rapidly rising stock prices induced by bursts of correlated optimism correlated with high realized
growth rates of dividends.  The structure of correlation also implies that we should also expect to see
crashes induced by correlated pessimistic agents together with low realized growth rates of dividends.
We make one comment with respect to the low riskless rate. Matching many volatility
moment except the riskless rate depend mostly upon intensity and correlation. These moments exhibit
relatively low sensitivity to asymmetry. Hence, apart from the riskless rate, many long term volatility
measures are explained by a broad configuration of the intensity parameters and correlation across
agents’ beliefs. The low riskless and a few others require asymmetry. 
4.2.3 Why Does the Model of Diverse Beliefs Resolve the Equity Premium Puzzle?
Risk premia are compensations for risk perceived by risk averse agents. In single agent models
the market portfolio is identified with a security whose payoff is aggregate consumption, mostly taken
to be exogenous. The Equity Premium Puzzle is thus an observation that the small volatility of
aggregate consumption growth cannot justify a 6% equity premium given the degree of risk aversion.
The theory of diverse beliefs offers a clear resolution of the Puzzle by studying optimal behavior and
consumption growth rate volatility on the individual, not the aggregate level.  
Any theory of diverse beliefs implies that at each date the risk premium perceived by an agent
is subjective. The risk premium required by an investor with a bullish outlook is smaller than the risk
premium required by a bear. Hence to resolve the Equity Premium Puzzle a theory must explain why
some agents are willing to hold a riskless asset paying a real return of only 1% when the average
return on the risky stock is 7%. The 7% return on the stock is entirely explainable by fundamental
factors of growth and productivity, together with the added high volatility of returns induced by58
factors of intensity and correlation of beliefs which generate Endogenous Uncertainty. The problem is
the low riskless rate. Pessimistic agents who aim to preserve capital are willing to earn low return on
their investment and with enough of them around the riskless rate would indeed fall. But can a desire
to preserve capital by those avoiding the risky stock be compatible with fat tails in returns? This is the
role of asymmetry. Symmetry between bulls and bears generates fat tails only due to intensity and
correlation. Agents are intense when they are bulls and correlation causes the majority sentiment to
fluctuate. Fat tails then reflect fluctuations of the majority between bull or bear averages. After all
when a majority of agents try to sell or buy the stock, the price fluctuates. But to push the riskless
rate down we need the asymmetric persistence of the bear view by those who expect the stock to
deliver low excess returns. Expecting low excess returns they would rather avoid the risky stock and
hold the bond at lower return. The fact that bears are in the majority of investors at the majority of
dates constitute the extra factor which lowers the riskless rate as well.
We turn to the low volatility of aggregate consumption growth. Diverse beliefs cause diverse
individual consumption growth rates even if aggregate consumption is exogenous, which is the case in
the models here. This is true not only because of idiosyncratic factors but also because under diverse
beliefs markets are inherently incomplete and the representative agent model does not capture the
conditions of individual consumers. Hence, volatility of individual consumption growth rates are
higher than the volatility of the aggregate rate, an empirical fact supported by household survey data.
Since agents’ perceived volatility of their own consumption growth is different from the aggregate
rate, they do not seek to own a portfolio whose payoff is aggregate consumption. Consequently, one
must not focus on the relation between asset returns and aggregate consumption growth but instead,
on the relation between perceived asset returns and perceived volatility of individual consumption
growth. The key question is then, how volatile do individual consumption growth rates need to be in
order to generate an equity premium of 6% and a riskless rate of 1%?  The answer is: not very much.
Relative to their equilibrium,  Kurz et al. (2005a) report that although the standard deviation of the
aggregate consumption growth rate is  , the standard deviation of individual consumption 0.03256
growth rates supporting the premium in the simulations is only 0.039 and the required correlation
between individual consumption growth rate and the growth rate of dividends is only 0.83 (compared
to 1.00 in a representative household model).  Both figures are compatible with survey data.59
4.2.4 Predictability of Stock Returns
The problem of predictability of risky returns generated a large literature in empirical finance
(e.g. Fama and French (1988a,1998b), Poterba and Summers (1988), Campbell and Shiller (1988),
Paye and Timmermann (2003)).  This debate originates in the theoretical observation that under risk
aversion asset prices and returns are not martingales and contain a predictable component. In this
context Kurz et al. (2005a) use the model associated with Table 2 to generate simulated data with
which they examine the following: (i) variance ratio statistic; (ii) autocorrelation of returns and of
price/dividend ratios; (iii)  predictive power of the dividend yield. They then apply to simulated data
the standard tests used for market data and we report their results in 4.2.5.a and 4.2.5.b. Recalling
that   is the growth rate of dividends and  is the price dividend ratio, the standard notation used in vt qt
this literature is to let   be the log of gross one year stock return,   be kt'log[
(qt%1)e
vt
qt&1
] k
k
t 'j
k&1
i'0 kt&i
the cumulative log-return of k-year length from t-k+1 to  t,  and  be the cumulative k
k
t%k'j
k
j'1 kt%j
log-return over a  k-year horizon from t+1 to  t+k.
4.2.4a  Variance Ratio Test
The variance-ratio is  . If returns are uncorrelated this ratio converges to 1 VR(k)'
var(k
k
t)
(k var(kt))
as k rises. If returns are negatively autocorrelated at some lags, the ratio is less than one.  Kurz et al.
(2005a) show there exists a significant higher order autocorrelation in simulated stock returns hence a
long run predictability which is consistent with U.S. data on stock returns, as in Poterba and Summers
(1988). In Table 3 Kurz et al. (2005a) report the computed values of the ratios for k = 1, 2, ..., 10
and compare them with the ratios in the empirical record reported by Poterba and Summers ((1988)
,Table 2, line 3)  for k = 1, 2,...,8. The model’s prediction is close to the U.S. empirical record
Table 3: Variance Ratios for NYSE 1926 - 1985
k 123 456789 1 0
VR(k) 1.00 0.85 0.73 0.64 0.57 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.34
U.S. 1.00 0.96 0.84 0.75 0.64 0.52 0.40 0.35 --- ---
4.2.4b The Autocorrelation of Log-Returns and Price-Dividend ratios
In Table 4 we report the Kurz et al. (2005a) autocorrelation function of log annual returns.
The model predicts negatively autocorrelated returns at all lags.  This implies a long horizon mean60
reversion of the kind documented by Poterba and Summers (1988), Fama and French (1998a) and
Campbell and Shiller (1988).   Thus, apart from the very short returns which exhibit positive
autocorrelation, the model reproduces the empirical record.
Table 4: Autocorrelation of Log-Returns
Model Empirical Record corr(kt,kt&k)
i = 1
i = 2
i = 3
i = 4
i = 5
-0.154
-0.094
-0.069
-0.035
-0.040
   0.070
 -0.170
 -0.050
 -0.110
 -0.040
In Table 5 we report the autocorrelation function of the price-dividend ratio reported by Kurz
et al. (2005a).  The table shows the model generates a highly autocorrelated price/dividend ratio
which matches reasonably well the behavior of U.S. stock market data.  The empirical record in
Tables 4 and 5 is for NYSE data for 1926-1995 as reported in Barberis et al. (2001).
Table 5: Autocorrelation of Price-Dividend Ratio
Model Empirical Record corr(qt,qt&k)
i = 1
i = 2
i = 3
i = 4
i = 5
0.695
0.485
0.336
0.232
0.149
0.700
0.500
0.450
0.430
0.400
4.2.4c  Dividend Yield as a Predictor of Future Stock Returns
The papers cited above show that the price/dividend ratio is the best explanatory variable of
long returns. To test this fact Kurz et al. (2005a) consider the following regression model 
(31) . k
k
t%k ' ζk % ηk(e
vt/qt&1) % ht,k
 is the dividend yield since it is the ratio between dividend paid at t and the stock price at t-1.  e
vt/qt&1
Table 6: The behavior of the regression slopes in (31)
Time horizon   Model Empirical Record
k    ηk R 2 ηk R 2
1  
2  
3  
4  
  5.03 
  8.66 
 11.16 
 13.10 
 0.08 
 0.14 
 0.18 
 0.21 
   5.32 
   9.08 
  11.73 
  13.44 
 0.07
 0.11
 0.15
 0.17
Fama and French (1988b) report that the ability of the dividend yield to forecast stock returns,61
measured by regression coefficient  of (31), increases with the return horizon. Kurz et al. (2005a) R 2
find the model captures the main features of the empirical evidence as reported in Table 6.
To conclude the discussion of predictability, observe that the empirical evidence reported by
Fama and French (1998a, 1998b), Campbell and Shiller (1988), Poterba and Summers (1998) and
others is consistent with asset price theories in which time-varying expected returns generate
predictable, mean-reverting components of prices (see Summers (1986)). The important question left
unresolved by these papers is what drives the predictability of returns implied by such mean-reverting
components of prices?  Part of the answer is the persistence of the dividend growth rate.  Kurz et al.
(2005a) offers a second and stronger persistent mechanism.  It shows these results are primarily
driven by the dynamics of market state of beliefs which exhibit correlation across agents and
persistence over time.  Agents go through bull and bear states causing their perception of risk to
change and expected returns to vary over time.  Equilibrium asset prices depend upon states of belief
which then exhibit memory and mean reversion.  Hence returns exhibit these same properties.
4.2.5 GARCH Behavior of the Price-dividend Ratio and of the Risky Returns
Stochastic volatility in asset prices and returns is well documented (e.g. Bollerslev, Engle and
Nelson (1994), Brock and LeBaron (1996)).  In partial equilibrium finance it is virtually standard to
model asset prices by stochastic differential equations, assuming an exogenously driven stochastic
volatility.  But where does stochastic volatility come from?  Dividends certainly do not exhibit
stochastic volatility. We now show that models with diverse beliefs can explains why asset prices and
returns exhibit stochastic volatility. 
To formally test the GARCH property of the price/dividend ratio and of the risky returns Kurz
et al. (2005a) use the 20,000 simulated observations noted in section 4.2.3. With that data they
estimate the following econometric model of the dynamics of the log of the price/dividend ratio
log(qt%1) ' κq % μqlog(qt) % ς
q
t%1
(32a) ς
q
t - N(0 , h
q
t )
. h
q
t ' ξ
q
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q
1(ς
q
t&1)
2 % ν
q
1h
q
t&1
Since the price dividend ratio is postulated to be an AR(1) process, the process in (32a) is
GARCH(1,1).  Similarly, for the risky rates of return they postulated the model
kt%1 ' κk % μklog(qt%1) % ς
k
t%162
(32b) ς
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For a specification of (32a) and (32b) they also tested ARCH(1) and GARCH(2,1) but have
concluded that the proposed GARCH(1,1) as in (32a)-(32b) , describes best the behavior of the data. 
Due to the large sample they ignore standard errors and report that the estimated model for the log of
the price-dividend ratio satisfies the GARCH(1,1) specification
log(qt%1) ' 0.99001 % 0.69384log(qt) % ς
q
t%1
ς
q
t - N(0 , h
q
t )
. h
q
t ' 0.00592 % 0.02370(ς
q
t&1)
2 % 0.73920h
q
t&1 ,R
2 ' 0.481
For the risky rates of return the estimated model satisfies the GARCH(1,1) specification
kt ' 1.13561 & 0.33355log(qt) % ς
k
t
ς
k
t - N(0 , h
k
t )
. h
k
t ' 0.00505 % 0.01714(ς
k
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2 % 0.77596h
k
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2 ' 0.180
To explain we observe that stochastic volatility is a direct consequence of the dynamics of
beliefs, defined by   in Kurz et al. (2005a).  Persistence of beliefs and correlation across (z
1
t ,z
2
t )
agents introduce these patterns into prices and returns. When agents disagree   they (i.e.z
1
t z
2
t <0)
offset the demands of each other and as that pattern persists, prices do not need to change by very
much for markets to clear. During such periods prices exhibit low volatility: persistence of belief
states induce persistence of low volatility. When agents agree   they compete for the (i.e. z
1
t z
2
t >0)
same assets and prices are determined by difference in belief intensities. Changes in the levels of bull
or bear states generate high volatility in asset prices and returns.  Persistence of beliefs cause such
high volatility regimes to exhibit persistence.  Market volatility is then time dependent and has a
predictable component as in (32a)-(32b).   
The virtue of the above argument is that it explains stochastic volatility as an endogenous
consequence of equilibrium dynamics.  Some “fundamental” shocks (i.e. an oil shock) surely cause
market volatility, but it has been empirically established that market volatility cannot be explained
consistently by “fundamental” exogenous shocks (e.g. Schwert (1989),  Pesaran and Timmermann 
(1995), Beltratti and Morana (2006)).  The Kurz et al. (2005a) explanation of stochastic volatility is
thus consistent with the empirical evidence63
4.3  Volatility of foreign exchange rates and the forward discount bias 
The relevance of foreign exchange markets to our discussion in this chapter is motivated by
the following problem. Estimate a regression of the form
(36)
ext%1 & ext
ext
' c % ζ(r
D
t & r
F
t ) % gt%1
where   is the change of the exchange rate between t and t + 1 and   is the (ext%1 & ext) (r
D
t & r
F
t )
difference between the short term nominal interest rates in the domestic and the foreign economies. 
Under rational expectations  is an unbiased predictor of . It is motivated by a (r
D
t & r
F
t ) (ext%1 & ext)
standard arbitrage argument: if there is a  differential in nominal rates agents can borrow in one
country and invest in the other and gain from the difference if the exchange rate does not move
against them by the amount of the differential. In a no arbitrage REE a rationally expected change in
the exchange rate must then be equal to the interest rate differential. This means that apart from a
technical correction for risk aversion, the parameter ζ  should be close to 1.  In 75 empirical studies ζ
was estimated to be significantly less than 1 and in many studies it was estimated to be negative (see
Froot and Frankel (1989), Frankel and Rose (1995), and Engel (1996) for an extensive survey).  
The failure of  ζ  to exhibit estimated values close to 1 is known as the "Forward Discount
Bias" in foreign exchange markets. The empirical fact is that exchange rates are far more volatile than
can be explained by differentials in nominal interest rates or inflation rates between countries. But 
changes in foreign exchange rates are not predictable and interest rate differentials account only for a
small fraction of the movements in foreign exchange rates. However, it is not surprising that this lack
of predictability decreases with the length of time involved. That is, long run differentials in nominal
interest rates do exhibit better predictive power of long run movements in foreign exchange rates
since long run differentials in nominal rates reflect differentials in inflation rates. Since the problem at
hand is the nature of market expectations and exchange rate volatility, it is a natural for us to consider
it here and the model of diverse belief is an obvious candidate to be used to solve the problem. 
Applying the rational belief theory to this problem, Kurz (1997b) and Black (1997), (2005)
developed a model which is similar to the Kurz and Motolese (2001) model  except for treating the
second agent as a second country and adding two nominal debt instruments. A similar model was also
reformulated by Kurz and Motolese (2001). Limitation of space makes it impossible to review all64
technical details of these models here. Instead, we outline the key points of the model construction
and note the results. Hence, the central model construction elements in these papers are as follows
• consider the first agent as the "domestic U.S." which is the home country and the second
agent as a "foreign economy;"
• introduce a second shock which is associated with productivity in the foreign economy and is
different from the first shock defined for productivity in the domestic economy;
• introduce a monetary system for both countries and a second currency;
• introduce two nominal interest rates and two different monetary policies;
• there are the two standard financial assets: (i) ownership shares of a domestic firm with
stochastic dividend whose stock trades freely in both currencies across the countries, and (ii) a
zero net supply riskless bond which pays a unit of consumption and which trades in both
currencies across the countries; 
• introduce a simple production structure for the foreign economy;
Note that the models above do not aim to simulate the U.S. or world economies. They merely aim to
explain via simulations why a model with diverse beliefs imply   ζ < 1. And indeed, all models produce
estimated parameters  ζ which are significantly less than 1: in the rational belief equilibrium of Kurz
(1997b) the estimated  ζ is around 0.25, in Black (1997), (2005) it is around 0.15 and in Kurz and
Motolese (2001) it is around  0.45.  More realistic results could be obtained by formulating more
realistic models but the key idea of these papers is that the result  ζ < 1 is virtually independent of the
model formulation. We now provide an explanation for this strong conclusion.  
Why do diverse beliefs predict that  ζ is less than 1?  If  ζ < 1 in an REE agents can make an
expectational arbitrage: they can borrow today in one currency, invest in the other and expect that the
net return on their investment next period will be larger than the depreciation of the currency. In such
an equilibrium all agents hold the same self-fulfilling expectations, the expectational arbitrage
becomes a real arbitrage and consequently this implies that  ζ < 1 cannot hold in equilibrium.
In a world with diverse beliefs equilibrium exchange rate depends upon the distribution of
beliefs and hence exchange rates exhibit excess volatility, reflecting the variability of investors’ beliefs.
Indeed, volatility of foreign exchange rates is dominated by endogenous uncertainty. The implication
is that regardless of the information today, to forecast future exchange rates agents must forecast
future market states of beliefs rendering exchange rate virtually unpredictable . Hence, if a condition65
of differential nominal interest rates across countries arises, it can never be the only factor that will
determine the exchange rate next period. With risk averse agents who are unable to predict the
exchange rate a condition of differential interest rates will not generate the beliefs of traders that the
exchange rate will, in fact, adjust. Failing to expect the exchange rate to adjust, they will not
undertake such arbitrage and the exchange rate will, in fact, not adjust. This mechanism ensures that a
differential of nominal interest rates between the two countries is not an unbiased estimate of the rate
of depreciation of the exchange rate one period later hence ζ < 1. This reasoning does not hold in the
long run since a long term differential of nominal interest rates will persuade the markets that the
exchange rate must adjust in the long run and this will persuade them to engage in such arbitrage.
4.4 Macroeconomic Applications
Although there is a wide range of potential applications in Macroeconomics, so far only
limited questions have been studied with the model of diverse beliefs. Motolese (2001), (2003) shows
that in an economy with diverse beliefs money is not neutral. To see why it is important to observe
that before rational expectations the case for money neutrality was based on the quantity theory of
money. The main contribution of Lucas (1972) was to show that money neutrality can be proved only
by an exploration of the structure of expectations. In a model with heterogenous beliefs agents hold
diverse beliefs about the relative effects of productivity growth and money shocks hence they hold
diverse beliefs about future inflation. With diverse expectations money cannot be neutral. 
Kurz et al. (2005b) is a comprehensive study of the efficacy of monetary policy in an economy
with diverse beliefs. The authors show that diverse beliefs constitute an important propagation
mechanism of fluctuations, money non neutrality and efficacy of monetary policy.  Since expectations
affect demand, the theory shows that economic fluctuations are driven mostly by varying demand not
supply shocks. Using a competitive model with flexible prices in which agents hold Rational Beliefs
the authors arrive at six conclusions: 
(i) the model economy replicates well the empirical record of fluctuations in the U.S. 
(ii) Under monetary rules without discretion, monetary policy has a strong stabilization effect
and an aggressive anti-inflationary policy can reduce inflation volatility to zero.  
(iii) The statistical Phillips Curve changes substantially with policy instruments and activist
policy rules render it vertical.  66
(iv) Although prices are flexible, money shocks result in less than proportional changes in
inflation hence the aggregate price level is “sticky” with respect to money shocks. 
(v) Discretion in monetary policy adds a random element to policy and increases volatility. 
The impact of discretion on the efficacy of policy depends upon the structure of market beliefs
about future discretionary decisions. The paper studies two rationalizable beliefs. In one case,
market beliefs weaken the effect of policy and in the second, beliefs bolster policy outcomes
hence, in this case, discretion is a desirable attribute of the policy rule. That is, social gains
from discretion arise only under special structures of belief of the private sector about future
bank discretionary acts and such requirement complicates the bank’s problem.  Hence, the
weight of the argument leads Kurz et al. (2005b) to conclude that bank’s policy should be
transparent and abandon discretion except for rare and unusual circumstances. This analysis
is in contrast with the recent literature initiated by Morris and Shin (2005) and others who
suggest that due to asymmetric private information central bank transparency has inherent
cost of failing to retrieve useful private information by the bank. We have rejected the
applicability of the private information model for the study of economic aggregates such as
interest rates, inflation rate or GDP growth. Hence, the Morris and Shin (2005) model does
not address the real problem associated with the objective of Central Bank transparency,
which is the coordination of expectations. 
(vi) One implication of the model suggests that the present day policy is only mildly activist
and aims mostly to target inflation.
5.  Conclusions and Open Problems
Rational expectations and irrational behavior are extreme hypotheses: with REE one cannot
explain the observed data on market dynamics and with irrational behavior one can prove anything.
We highlight here the merit of an intermediate concept of belief rationality that emerges from the fact
that the economy is a non-stationary system with time varying structure. This prevents agents from
ever learning true structural relations and probability laws. All they learn are the empirical frequencies
from which emerges a common knowledge of a stationary probability reflecting the long term
dynamics. Belief rationality requires agents to hold only beliefs which are not contradicted by the
empirical evidence. But since it is irrational to believe in a fixed deviation from the stationary67
probability, such belief rationality implies belief dynamics: individual beliefs must be time varying and
correlation across agents generates a new aggregate force in market dynamics which is the dynamics
of market beliefs. The main observation made in this chapter is that the dynamics of market belief is a
central market force which is as important to asset pricing and allocation as the dynamics of
productivity or public policy. Indeed, the dynamics of market belief explains well the 4 recessions
which Samuelson noted the market predicted but which did not happen. It shows that a rational
market makes forecasting mistakes and rational investors are not infallible. They may use wrong
forecasting models. Once we recognize that being rational and being wrong are not incompatible and
no psychological impulses are needed for this proposition, we are open to a new paradigm of market
dynamics. It provides a coherent explanation to most dynamical phenomena of interest as outlined in
this chapter.  We thus sum up our five central conclusions: 
(i) Diverse beliefs without any private information is an empirical fact and such diversity provide
a strong motive to trade assets and hedge subjectively perceived risks.
(ii) Financial markets are the great arena for agents to trade differences in beliefs. 
(iii) The dynamics of market beliefs is a central component of asset price volatility and this
component of risk has been named endogenous uncertainty. Market belief is observable.
(iv) Asset markets exhibit large excess volatility of prices, returns and high volume of trade due to
the dynamics of belief. 
(v) Risk premia reflect the added market risk due to the dynamics of beliefs and in some markets
the component of risk premia due to the dynamics of market belief is very significant.
Important problems, which we have not discussed, are still open. some of which are being
researched at this time. Five examples are as follows:
Pareto Optimality. The concept of ex-ante Pareto Optimum is not a satisfactory concept for market
with diverse beliefs . To attain any Pareto improvement all agents must believe it is an improvement
and that is not likely. Hence, most stabilization policies would not be Pareto improving. Following the
idea of ex-post Pareto Optimality (e.g. Starr (1973) and Hammond (1981) ) progress on this issue
was made by Nielsen (2003) and (2006) who argued that a currency union is superior to multiple
currencies since a union would eliminate endogenous uncertainty inherent in foreign exchange rates.
Stabilization Policy. When the problem of Pareto Optimality is resolved, the door will be open to a
study of the desirability of stabilization public policies. Some start has been made by Kurz et al.68
(2005b) regarding stabilizing monetary policy. But the question is broader. Should the Fed target the
stock market? Should countries cooperate to avoid an international financial crisis? What is the role
of an international convention regarding bank reserve requirements? Under REE these type of
questions are set aside since it is often argued that the market solution is best and no cooperative
policy is needed. In a world of diverse beliefs this is not true and the question is open. 
Continuous time reformulation. A continuous time reformulation of the RB theory would open the
door to a study of the decomposition of risk into fundamental and endogenous components. With
such formulation available one can formulate the decomposition of the values of derivative securities,
using Black Scholes, into the fundamental and endogenous components. Such a decomposition is
likely to provide an explanation to the Smile Curves in derivative pricing. 
Destabilizing speculation of futures markets. Could the opening of a future’s market increase the
volatility of a spot market? This is an old question which has not been fully clarified. Our conjecture is
that a proper formulation of the problem will show that if margin requirements and leverage
conditions are sufficiently relaxed in a futures market, its opening could give rise to endogenous
uncertainty which cannot arise in the spot market if storage cost are high enough. This could increase
the volatility of a spot market.
Volume of trade and Speculation. Markets with diverse beliefs are the natural arenas for agents to
trade differences in their beliefs and we have reviewed recent progress made by Wu and Guo on this
problem. However, the problem of speculation needs to be solved for economies with risk aversion.
Also, significant amount of empirical work has been done on patterns of the volume of trade but
much remains to be explained with formal models.
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Figure 1: 6-month Treasury Bill rate: 6 months ahead Market Belief.
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Figure 2: GDP de°ator for in°ation rate: 2 quarters ahead Market Belief.
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Figure 3: Month-over-Month, annualized growth rate of Industrial Production: 6 months ahead Market Belief.
16
-
gi > · gi < ·
´i(gi)
-
6
´i(gi)
Empirical Distribution
®
Empirical Distribution
U
Figure 4: Non-normal belief densities.
6
-
Empirical Distribution
gi < · gi > ·
Bear Bull
° °
N
¸g
v´i
t+1
¡
gi
t
¢
+ ~ ½v
i
t+1
Figure 5: Density ¢i
t+1(gi
t) with fat tails.
2